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FOREWARD 
The theme for the 1986 Conference of the New 
Zealand Branch of the Australian Agricultural Economics 
Society was "Economic Liberalisation in Agriculture: 
An International Comparison." The Organising committee 
adopted this theme recognising the very significant 
changes in the economnic environment which were being 
introduced. The removal of regulation, output and 
input subsidies, the floating of the exchange rate, the 
opening of the New Zealand economy to capital flows, 
the lowering of tariffs on manufactured goods all 
these factors were leading to a new economic climate 
for the primary sector. 
At the same time it was felt that we could benefit 
from the experiences of other countries which had 
implemented similiar programmes. Conscious of the need 
for New Zealand to have as much professional contact 
with the rest of the world as possible it was decided 
to invite a number of distinguished overseas speakers. 
The society is grateful to the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, the Economics Division of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, the Treasury and to the 
Federal Coun(lil of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society for their support in this endeavour. 
In addition, invitations were extended to a number 
of people to present papers which would complement the 
main theme of the conference, and I would personally 
like to express my thanks for their support. 
In an effort to continue improving the 
professional image of the New Zealand Branch, we 
introduced a style guide for authors and have tried to 
establish consistent editorial presentation. However, 
these poroceedings have been prepared with only limited 
editorial input; the papers were not subject to review 
and errors or omissions remain the responsibility of 
individual authors. 
Finally I would like to thank the Director and 
staff of the Agricultural Economics Research Unit at 
Lincoln College for their collaboration in the 
publication of these Proceedings. 
G. M. Scobie 
President 
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1. Introduction 
Few reform packages have led to as much controversy as the Southern 
Cone reforms in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, a close 
observer, was well aware of this when he cautiously stated that " •• • it is 
often difficult to establish where scientific econom1CS ends and political 
preference begins" (1981, p. 120). While not eschewing his centrist position, 
Diaz-Alejandro knew where to draw the line between scientific economics and 
political preferences and showed much foresight in his interpretations of 
Southern Cone reforms. In his early appraisal of Southern Cone stabilization 
plans, he foresaw, among other difficulties, the risks of using the exchange 
rate to bring down inflation (Diaz-Alejandro, 1981). Later on, he wrote on 
the moral hazard problem created by wholesale financial sector deregulation 
unaccompanied by banking sector supervision (Oiaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
Oiaz-Alejandro's insights aside, currently received wisdom about the 
outcomes of Southern Cone reform sometimes gives the impression of a state of 
disarray analogous to the economic disorder in the three countries themselves, 
as their dismal record has unraveled during the early 1980s. Some observers, 
notably in the press, have concluded that the reform effort as a whole was a 
failure. Others, including the present authors (1985a) have suggested that 
the microeconomic reforms were successful and that most of the problems that 
emerged resulted from inadequate macroeconomic policies. Still others have 
blamed failure on unfavorable external shocks (Sjaastad, 1982). Finally, some 
have asked whether the sequence in which the reforms were implemented may have 
been the major cause of failure (Edwards, 1984; Frenkel, 1985). 
Meanwhile, many countries now attempting to resume growth and 
maintain external balance are designing policy packages that invariably 
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include some if not most of the programs implemented by Southern Cone 
Governments. Because of apparent past failures, however, hesitation and doubt 
persist about the efficacy of these kinds of broad-based reform efforts. 
Thus, a better understanding of the proximate causes of their failure in the 
Southern Cone countries 1S not only of interest to the economic historian; it 
1S also a matter of pressing practical importance to today's policymakers 
elsewhere in the developing world, who need a clear sense of what oppor-
tunities they should seize, what pitfalls they should avoid -- and perhaps 
above all, what their own rational expectations of success should be. 
This paper uses the benefit of hindsight to examine these 
controversial reforms once more -- their pervasiveness, their implementation, 
and the contribution of external factors to their overall failure. The paper 
complements our earlier paper (Corbo, de Melo and Tybout, 1986), where we drew 
country-specific conclusions from what our research suggested were the major 
causes of ultimate failure in each country's reform package. Here we ask 
whether the reforms were undertaken in accordance with what seems to us to be 
the emerging consensus on how to implement stabilization and liberalization 
policies in developing countries. Elements of the consensus are summarized 1n 
Section 2. Next we briefly evaluate the reforms, mainly to dispel some 
misconceptions about the extent of liberalization (Section 3). We then use 
the framework suggested in Section 2 to draw lessons from the implementation 
of the reforms in each country, asking how far Southern Cone experience 
deviated from our V1ew of what the consensus would suggest (Section 4). 
Finally in Section 5 we address the issue of external shocks and report on 
preliminary econometric results from a model that tries to assess the extent 
to which terms-of-trade and interest rate shocks contributed to the 
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difficulties the Southern Cone countries have faced since the early 1980s. 
Conclusions follow in Section 6. 
2. The Design of a Stabilization and Liberalization Program: What do we Know? 
Take a country with macroeconomic imbalances and heavily regulated 
commodity and factor markets (including a highly protective trade regime and 
severe restrictions on foreign capital flows) where policymakers wish to 
implement an economic program aimed at reducing inflation and restoring 
growth. What would economists entrusted with the task of designing the 
program suggest? 
2.1. Stabilization 
For countries with inflation of about 50 percent or more a year, they 
would suggest a stabilization program up front before undertaking liberali-
zation. This is because the inflation itself is usually the most important 
source of distortion in such a situation. Side effects of inflation that 
impede appropriate economic performance are well documented [Fischer (1968b), 
Yeager (1981)] and are of four maln kinds: (1) high inflation makes relative 
prlces very volatile, reducing their information content (this is because 
changes in the rate of inflation do not affect all pr1ces and costs uniformly 
and at the same time); (2) the interest rate controls usually observed in 
countries with high inflation result 1n negative real rates that lead to 
credit rationing, distort investment decisions, and reduce the size of the 
formal financial system; (3) uncertainty about future inflation rates leads to 
financial transactions being concentrated in instruments with short rather 
than long term maturities, thus reducing the availability of funds for long-
term investment; (4) high inflation is also associated with sharp changes 1n 
the prices of tradables relative to nontradables, as periodic attempts to 
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control inflation through the exchange rate result 1n protracted periods of 
real currency appreciation. 
The recommendation for an up front stabilization program also stems 
from the fact that a successful liberalization depends on the credibility of 
the program, and on maintaining a fairly stable real exchange rate. High 
inflation makes both these objectives very difficult to attain. Not surpris-
ingly, there are few historical examples of simultaneous achievement of 
stabilization and liberalization. Indeed, one of the most extensive studies 
of trade liberalization reforms has concluded that their failures have stemmed 
mainly from the failure of the accompanying anti-inflationary programs 
[Krueger (1978), (1981)]. Hence the prevailing view that stabilization should 
precede liberalization when inflation is over, say, 50 percent a year [Fischer 
(1986), Sachs (1986a)]. !/ 
For countries with "intermediate" annual inflation rates of, say, 20-
50 percent, stabilization still remains a high priority but there is no abso-
lute ban on introducing liberalization and stabilization programs simultane-
ously. Any stabilization program should, however, avoid introducing major 
distortions that could jeopardize successful liberalization. In particular, 
real exchange rate appreciation should not be used as a major stabilization 
device. 2/ 
2.2. Liberalization 
Turning to liberalization, there is also broad agreement on general 
principles that go a long way towards defining the final contents of any 
reform package. In highly regulated economies with widespread price controls, 
the suggestion would be to lift price controls so as to improve resource 
allocation, while simultaneously deregulating domestic factor markets. 
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Financial markets should be deregulated (subject only to appropriate banking 
supervision rules), so as to improve credit allocation and thus to distribute 
investment more efficiently. Similarly, labor market restrictions should be 
lifted, so as to promote reallocation of newly liberated resources. 
On the foreign trade side, commercial policy should first replace QRs 
with equivalent tariffs. Then the variance of tariff rates and their average 
level should be reduced, with the objective of mov1ng towards a low, uniform 
tariff. As a rule, incentives should avoid discrimination against export 
oriented activities, and lead to approximate, uniform, and effective across-
the-board incentives for import competing activities (Salassa, 1976). 3/ 
Once we get beyond agreement on general principles, however, there 1S 
much disagreement on implementation. Implementation raises questions of 
dynamics, about which we know little. Here the literature addresses three 
sets of issues: (1) the speed of the reforms; (2) the sequencing of the 
program (i.e., which markets to liberalize first); and (3) the appropriate 
macroeconomic policies to minimize difficulties that arise during the 
transition to a more liberalized economy. We now discuss each of these 1n 
turn. 
Speed of reforms: The issue here is how fast one should implement a 
particular reform. Should one liberalize trade totally and instantly, or do it 
over 5 or 10 years? Should pr1ce controls be removed at a stroke or 
gradually? Should the interest rate ceiling be lifted at once or 
progressively? 
In approaching these and other questions of implementation, it 1S 
essential to keep in mind the fact that liberalization 1S not an end 1n 
itself, but a means to achieving one or more underlying objectives in differ-
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ent areas of economic policy. Reform initiatives thus need to be phased in 
terms of realistic timetables for reaching these objectives--which may differ 
from one policy area to another. A doctrinaire approach that ignores the pace 
at which adjustment to the reforms can take place runs the risk of the 
medicine killing the patient. 
On the foreign trade side, for example, the main purpose of 
liberalization is to improve resource allocation and raise productivity by 
eliminating discrimination against export-oriented industries (and import-
competing industries with low levels of protection). The speed of 
liberalization must therefore depend on the speed with which resources can 
realistically be expected to be reallocated to the sectors that have hitherto 
been discriminated against. Initial conditions, specific to each country, 
determine the speed at which redeployment can take place. For example, the 
smaller the investment/GNP ratio, the slower should be the speed of trade 
liberalization. Similarly, the greater the extent of labor mObility and the 
more competitive the labor market, the more quickly resources can be 
reallocated and thus the faster trade liberalization can proceed. 4/ 
Deregulation of financial markets can create several problems if 
initial conditions are overlooked. For example, if regulation has led to a 
substantial proportion of financial institutions' assets being held at below 
market rates, and real lending rates are substantially negative, then deregu-
lation of interest rates will create difficulties for existing financial 
intermediaries. In particular, if deposit and lending rates are deregulated 
simultaneously and new entrants are allowed into the financial system, then 
existing banks will be forced to pay market rates. Existing banks may then 
experience substantial capital losses, in turn putting the banking system's 
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solvency in jeopardy. This implies that in the transition phase, lending 
rates should be deregulated first, and deposit rates gradually thereafter. In 
this way, the capital losses of existing banks are minimized; then, as exist-
ing preferential loans come to maturity, controls and deposit rates can be 
lifted over time. 
Deregulation of controls on capital flows is another example of the 
importance of taking initial conditions into account. On the one hand, rapid 
liberalization of capital flows with deposit rates that are below free market 
levels, will result in capital outflows that could threaten the survival of 
the domestic financial system. On the other hand, if domestic interest rates 
are free and substantially above international levels, (when expressed in the 
same currency) decontrol of capital flows will result in large capital inflows 
that will create a real exchange rate appreciation which in turn will 
jeopardize the success of trade liberalization efforts (Bruno, 1983). 
Sequencing of Reforms: here too, economic theory offers little guidance about 
an optimal sequence for removing distortions when many markets are initially 
regulated. Nevertheless, some broad recommendations can be derived from 
general principles that recognize that the objective of liberalization is to 
1mprove resource allocation. This objective suggests that domestic markets 
should be deregulated first, so as to ensure that resource reallocation will 
take place. 
The second sta~e then involves liberalization of economic relations 
with the rest of the world. Here, it 1S usually argued that the current 
account of the balance of payments should be liberalized first with 
liberalization of the capital account later. Much has been written on this 
issue lately, (see McKinnon (l982), rrenkel (l982, 1983), Krueger (1984), 
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Edwards (1985». Two arguments have been put forward for liberalizing 
domestic markets and the current account before the capital account. First, 
since asset prices are determined by the present value of income streams, 
income streams generated by distorted prices will result in distorted asset 
prices [Krueger (1984)]. Second, since asset markets in general adjust much 
faster than commodity markets, liberalization of the capital account could 
result 1n large capital flows with unwanted consequences for the real exchange 
rate. By the same argument, the overall balance of payments constraint 
requires that the current and capital accounts be brought into line with each 
other, and thus, even though the two accounts tend to respond at different 
speeds, the overall constraint implies that the two speeds of adjustment must 
be harmonized. It is much easier to achieve this by slowing down capital 
ilows than by accelerating current account liberalization [Frenkel (1983), 
Edwards (1985)]. This point could be extended farther by arguing that, within 
the current account, import flows respond faster than export flows: thus, 
opening up the capital account first could jeopardize the overall process of 
trade liberalization. 
Macroeconomic policies for successful liberalization: During a liberali-
zation, macroeconomic policy should ensure an appropriate and stable real 
exchange rate, a low inflation rate, and a sustainable balance of payments 
position. This implies that countries starting a liberalization from high 
inflation will face complications. The first complication come from the 
simultaneous implementation of stabilization and liberalization policies. On 
the one hand, the success of stabilization depends on applying contractionary 
pressure to the economy as a whole, while, on the other, trade liberalization 
calls for the contraction of highly protected import competing firms and a 
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delayed expans10n 1n export oriented firms and import competing ones with 
little protection. With simultaneous application of both programs, the net 
contractionary pressure on highly protected import competing activities might 
be too strong to withstand. 
The second complication 1S downward price inflexibility. To overcome 
this phenomenon, trade liberalization has to be accompanied by a devaluation 
up front to achieve the desired improvement in the relative prices of 
exportables. However, the devaluation will also accelerate inflation or 
weaken the fight against it. 
In countries with low or intermediate inflation rates (below 50 
percent a year), macropolicies should be designed to maintain an "appropriate" 
and stable real exchange rate. For economies operating fixed or crawling peg 
exchange rate regimes, the initial tariff reduction should be accompanied by a 
devaluation that, while not restoring the pre-liberalization landed prices of 
imports, would permit an improvement in the relative prices of exportables 
[Mussa (1986)]. And for those countries that have discriminated against 
exportables for a long time, an up front improvement in the relevant incen-
tives is also necessary to move resources toward exportables. 
Besides exchange rate policy, other elements of macroeconom1C policy 
should also be redesigned to support the liberalization effort. Thus, 
monetary expansion should be compatible with exchange rate pegging rules, so 
as to avoid a loss of confidence 1n the pegging rule that in turn might 
jeopardize the success of the overall reform package. Fiscal policy should 
try to ensure that the fiscal deficit is compatible with the domestic .credit 
expansion resulting from a stable pegging rule [Buiter (1985)]. Also, the 
part of the deficit that is financed in the domestic capital market should ndt 
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crowd out the financing of the sectors that are meant to expand. Likewise, 
credit policy should ensure access to credit at competitive rates for the 
expanding sectors, while simultaneously denying cheap credit to previously 
heavily protected import competing sectors (because its availability could 
slow down their adjustment). Finally, labor market arrangements should be 
flexible enough to allow for a drop 1n the consumption wage in previously 
heavily protected sectors and/or to allow the reallocation of labor toward the 
sectors that were previously discriminated against. Otherwise, unemployment 
will result. 
3. Southern Cone Reforms: A Synopsis 5/ 
3.1 The Pre-reform Period 
After three decades of import substitution, the economies of the 
three Southern Cone countries had by the early 1970s become among the most 
distorted in the developing world. Expansionary demand policies to promote 
output growth, combined with fixed exchange rates, pervasive price controls 
(over 90% of the CPI basket was controlled in each country) and restrictive 
trade regimes, resulted in an acceleration of inflation, bottlenecks in pro-
duction, chronic balance of payment difficulties, and slow export growth. 6/ 
During the pre-reform period, trade policies in the three countries 
were similarly and strongly biased in favor of import substituting industri-
alization (lSI) and against exports. All three countries had experienced mild 
trade liberalization experiments: Chile in the late 1960s, Argentina in the 
second half of the same decade, and Uruguay in 1959. In each case, there was 
a return to a very restrictive trade regime with widespread tariff and non-
tariff barriers. 
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Table la: 
Effective Protection and Trade Openness in Argentina 
Effecti ve Protectlon - --_._-------- --- ----_ ... _-------------- Lega 1 tariff· 
to value added rates 
Domestic Dec 1977 
1969 (%) 
Primary activities -8.0 321 Textiles 57.4 
Processed foods 44.0 322 Clothing 95.0 
Beverages and tobacco 95.0 341 Paper and paper products 29.0 
Construction materials 31.0 351 Industrial chemicals 35.2 
Intermediate products I 146.0 352 Other chemicals 17.0 
Intermediate products II 9.0 355 Rubber products 45.0 
Non-durable consumer goods 50.0 362 Glass 41.8 
Consumer durables 145.0 369 Other non-metallic mineral products 11.0 
Machinery 120.0 371 Basic ferrous metal products 48.2 
Transport equipment 207.0 372 Basic non-ferrous metal products 44.5 
Equally weighted arithmetic mean 83.9 381 Metal products 45.9 
mean 382 Non-electrical machinery 65.5 
Standard deviation 69.7 383 Electrical machinery 61.3 
Variability coefficient 0.8 384 Transport equipment 87.2 
Range 215.0 385 Scientific and other equipment 50.0 
Weighted average 52.7 
Trade as % of GOP 
Years 1929 1951-55 1965-70 1971-73 1974-79 1980-82 
% 36.0 39.4 15.6 17.0 19.2 17.6** 
NB: Both sets of estimates based on price comparisons; 1977 estimates are for 90 products and 
probably underestimate protection because of the prevailing high real exchange rate in 1977. 
(See Figure I.) 
Source: Berlinski and Sehydlowsky (1982) for 1968 and Nogues (1985) for 1977. 
**Does not include 1982. 
Realized 
protect ion 
rates 
(%) 
Feb 1977 
41.1 
79.2 
30.8 
36.6 
0.0 
29.6 
12.3 
0.0 
60.7 
47.0 
10.0 
19.7 
55.7 ~ 
29.7 
73.3 
37.1 
Table 1b: 
Effective Protection and Trade Openness in Chile 
Effective protection (%) 
Consumer goods 
Intermediate goods 
Machinery and transport equipment 
Equally weighted arithmetric mean 
Standard deviation 
Variability coefficient 
Range 
Simple averages 
1967 1974 1979 
138.8 
172.9 
265.3 
176.7 
279 
1.57 
1163 
189.7 
139.6 
96.0 
151.4 
60.4 
0.399 
216 
13.2 
14.0 
13.0 
13.61 
1.7 
0.124 
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Openness: Foreign trade as % of GDP 
Years 
Average 
openness 
(%) 
1929 
66.3 
1951-55 1965-70 
21. 7 24.0 
Sources: Corbo and Meller (1981). 
Aedo and Lagos (1984). 
IMF. 
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1971-73 1974-79 1980-82 
20.3 36.1 32.6 
Table lc: 
Protection and Trade Openness In Uruguay 
Nominal Protection and Redundant Protection 
1968 1978 1980 1981 1982 
Nominal protection 
Domestic sales: formal 263 86 (72 ) 2.! 40 46 (39) a/ 60 implicit na 25 36 38 ( 1 ) d/ 41 
Export sales (NRP) 4 16 16 (-18 ) d/ 22 
Redundant protection b/ na 23 6 8 
on domestic sales 
Effective Protection: 1968 and 1981 
1968 Weighted C .V. e/ Unwelghted 
(1981) (1981) 
Domestic sales 384 75 (27) d/ 103 118 
(Potent I a I) ~/ (89) (37) d/ ( 107 ) 
Export sales 37 30 (-5) d/ 184 39 
(Potential) ~ (20 ) (-13) d/ (33) 
Effective protection to 
domestic sales by major na 
product categories ( 1981 ) 
Durables 317 
Non-durables 37 
Intermediates 101 
Machinery and transport na 286 
equipment 
Openness: Foreign trade as % of GDP 
Years 1951-55 1965-70 1971-73 1974-79 1980-82 
Average 
openness 19.6 27.3 25.1 36.2 33.9 (% ) 
NB: 1982 calculations with 1981 weights. AI I rates, unless otherwise 
noted, represent weighted averages: product weights at world prices. 
a/ Without reference prices. 
b/ Computed as the difference between the formal nominal rate of 
protection and the landed price (Inclusive of customs duties) of 
corresponding Imported goods. 
c/ Potential effective protection computed using formal nominal rates 
of protection. 
d/ Adjusted for exchange rate deviation from purchasing power parity. 
e/ C.V. = coefficient of variation. 
Sources: 1968 Benslon and Caumont (1981). 
1978-82 CLNVE (1983) and Mezzera and de Melo (1985). 
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Fragmentary evidence on effective protection (see Tables la, 1b and 
1c) shows high effective rates of protection to domestic sales in each 
country: 84% in Argentina (1969); 151% in Chile (1974); 384% in Uruguay 
(1969). The variability of protection across sectors, an indicator of 
distortion in incentives, was also very high in the three countries, and for 
no good economic reason; rather, it was the piecemeal result of pressures 
imposed by different domestic interest groups. 
As a result of increasing protectionism, the openness of the three 
economies had decreased steadily since the late 1920s. As shown in Tables la, 
1b, and 1c, the total share of trade (exports plus imports) in GDP was only 
25.1% for Uruguay, the smallest of the three countries, in the early 1970s. 
Chile's share was only 20.3% and Argentina's was only 17%. These percentages 
were well below the norm for countries of similar size and level of 
development (see Chenery and Sryquin, 1975). 
In additions to distortions created by the prevailing price controls 
and commercial and fiscal incentives, all three countries were 1n severe 
macroeconomic disequilibrium (see Table 2). Both Chile (1973) and Argentina 
(1976) faced high fiscal deficits, severe deficit-induced inflation and 
balance of payments crises with acute foreign exchange shortages. Public 
sector deficits averaged 10 percent of GOP in Argentina and Chile during 1971-
73 and 3 percent in Uruguay. 7/ Uruguay was the only country of the three 
not in deep crisis by the early 1970s and the only one to have some foreign 
exchange reserves; nonetheless, its economy had registered virtually zero per 
capita growth for 20 ye~rs. 
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3.2 Orthodox and Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization 
The first task facing the new economic teams 1n each country was to 
control galloping inflation. Programs to this end were implemented in two 
identifiable phases: first, an orthodox attempt to control the money supply, 
and to restrain or reduce public expenditures; and second, an exchange-rate-
based stabilization starting in 1978 when money supply was believed to be 
endogenous because of high capital mobility. 
During this first phase Chile's substantial and chronic fiscal 
deficit was eliminated by drastic across-the-board expenditure cuts (amounting 
to 15 percent in 1975 alone), followed by a tax reform. In Uruguay, the 
fiscal deficit was reduced yearly up to 1980. Here, much credit should be 
given to the rationalization of taxation, including the introduction of a 
value added tax (VAT) which improved fiscal performance compared to the poor 
record of the pre-reform period (see Harberger and Wisecarver 1977). In 
Argentina, on the other hand, the fiscal deficit was never really controlled 
(Cavallo and Pena 1983). 
It was expected that these "orthodox" measures would be contraction-
ary but it was thought that their potential benefits would easily outweigh the 
temporary costs of recession. Reducing absorption was much more important 1n 
Argentina and Chile than in Uruguay; hence, not surprisingly, the short run 
recesslon was most severe in Chile, the country where the most progress was 
made in controlling inflation (Table 2). In addition, the recessionary 
effects of the stabilization effort were compounded in Chile by a severe terms 
of trade loss in 1975. In Argentina, where inflation was more severe, intense 
concern about the political consequences of unemployment limited the stabili-
zation effort [Fernandez (1985)]. 
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Table 2: 
Southern Cone Macro-e conom I c In d I cators by: Sub2erlod: 1941-83 
Pre-reform Reforms Post-refor 
crisis 
Average annual growth 
rate (percent) 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1965-70 1971-73 1974-76 1977-78 1979-81 1982-83 
Chile 
Gross domestic product 4.00 4.40 4.50 4.10 1.30 -1.80 7.80 6.90 -7.40 
Expenditure 4.00 4.50 4.00 5.10 1.30 -8.20 11.90 10.20 -14.40 
Exports 11.60 3.40 9.40 11.80 9.90 23.50 7.90 20.40 -0.10 
Imports 12.30 8.80 6.50 8.10 5.60 22.30 35.20 28.70 -30.20 
Gross fixed Investment na 41.80 1.70 5.30 -9.80 -7.80 16.70 17.80 -26.60 
Consumer pr Ices na 37.60 27.20 23.30 149.70 358.00 79.00 30.20 11.70 
Average (percent) 
Fiscal deficit/GOP na na 1.60 2.10 16.10 5.10 1.30 -2.10 3.10 
Unemployment rate na na na 6.00 4.60 14.20 13.60 12.20 22.20 
Real wage na na na 98.00 98.00 69.00 82.00 100.00 82.00 
Gross Investment/GOP na 10.00 15.40 14.40 12.10 16.00 14.00 16.70 13.30 
Terms of trade (1968 = 100) 63.30 73.40 89.40 101.40 92.70 79.00 60.30 56.10 42.50 
Current account/GOP na 1.10 2.40 1.40 2.90 2.60 5.60 9.10 7.40 
Uruguay 
Gross domestic product 4.00 0.00 1.60 2.10 -0.40 4.30 3.20 4.70 -7.20 
Expenditure 4.00 0.80 1.30 2.90 -0.20 1.9 0 3.60 5.60 -11.20 
Exports 16.50 -3.70 6.50 3.90 16.80 21.40 10.20 21.80 -2.90 
Impcrts 16.30 5.70 1.90 3.90 8.70 30.20 14.00 32.10 -30.70 
Gross fixed Investment na 5.80 -1.50 7.30 -10.80 25.00 10.50 6.90 -24.80 
Consumer p rices na 23.20 47.90 49.80 62.70 69.20 51.30 54.00 33.30 
Average (percent) 
Fiscal deflclt/GOP na na na 1.90 3.20 3.80 1.90 0.00 6.40 
Unemployment rate na na na 8.20 8.10 9.70 12.40 8.40 13.70 
Real wage na na na 104.00 102.00 86.00 70.00 64.00 54.00 
Gross Investment na 13.00 12.20 11.30 10.10 13.00 15.60 16.10 13.50 
Terms of trade (1968 = 100) 114.50 115.60 109.50 107.20 134.90 76.00 90.70 89.00 78.70 
Current account/GOP na na 3.50 0.05 -0.50 3.40 3.20 5.40 0.70 
Argent-Ina 
Gross domestic product 2.50 3.50 4.40 4.20 2.90 0.80 3.70 -3.00 
Expenditure na 6.50 3.10 4.20 3.30 -1.60 8.60 -6,10 
Exports 13.00 2.20 5.70 11.50 21.30 29.90 12.70 0.10 
Imports 20.10 5.60 4.30 9.00 29.60 2.10 41.40 -23.20 
Gross f I xed Investment na 13.50 30.60 2.60 7.60 -1.10 -0.90 -3.00 
Consumer prices 15.30 30.50 21.50 29.90 138.70 225.50 118.10 188.50 
Average (percent) 
Public sector deficient/GOP 
.Y 5.90 6.00 4.40 3.70 10.10 11.60 10.10 17.80 Unemployment rate na na na 5.70 2.40 3.40 2.20 4.70 
Real wage na na na 125.00 154.00 100.00 118.00 11 1.00 
Gross Investment/GOP na 22.50 18.80 19.10 21.44 26.40 23.60 17.20 
Terms of trade (1968 = 100) 124.60 100.80 103.00 120.10 133.40 89.00 86.50 88.20 
Current account/GOP na 1.90 -0.50 0.20 1.50 -2.10 0.50 3.80 
Sources: National Accounts and Corbo, de Me 10 and Tybout (1986, Table 1) unless otherwise Indicated. 
I/Cavallo and Pena (1984). 
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Anti-inflationary policy measures alone were considered insufficient 
for eliminating balance of paymeilts difficulties. Heilce, stabilization 
policies iil each country also included major attempts to switch 
expenditures. In Chile; the switching was achieved through a large real 
devaluation and reduction of batriers to imports. In Argentina, switching 
ef~orts included a combination of real devaluation, reduction of taxes on 
exports, and some reduction of import barriers. In Uruguay, expenditure 
switching combined real devaluation, reduction of barriers to imports, and 
introduction of subsidies for non-traditional exports~ to avoid a repetitioil 
of previous external crises, all three countries eliminated multiple exchange 
rates for commodity trade and, more importantly, complemeilted their initial 
parity changes with a passive crawling peg exchange tate regime aimed at 
maintaining purchasing power parity adjusted by changes in the terms of 
trade. 
These initial efforts successfully el iminated the balance of payments 
cr1ses. What was done during the first phase (i.e. until 1978), was certainly 
1n line with the framework suggested in Section 2! reduction of inflation and 
up front devaluation to achieve expenditure switching. In the event, however, 
inflation remained disturbingly high several years after the contractionary 
policies had been implemented. 8/ Meanwhile Argentina's fiscal deficit still 
averaged over 11% of GDP during 1916-78~ but Chile's and Uruguay's deficits 
averaged less than 2% of GDP during 1977-18 (see Table 2). The persisting 
pressure on pr1ces prompted a major shift in tactics, towards a second phase 
of stabilization policy 1n which the exchange rate was used to reduce 
inflat ion. 8/ 
18 
Expectations about inflation and devaluation were recognized as 
important determinants of the dynamics of stabilization, and it was believed 
that exchange rate targets announced up to six months in advance and with 
forward devaluations at a decreasing rate would break inflationary 
expectations. In practice, the rate of devaluation, which was set in 
accordance with a preannounced schedule known as the tablita, was less than 
the existing difference between domestic and world inflation. This policy 
corresponded to an "active" crawling peg, and was clearly a departure from 
orthodoxy. 9/ 
Proponents of the new approach thought that purchasing power 
(especially in Chile) and interest parity (in Uruguay and Argentina)--both 
resulting from the forces of competition in freely operating commodity and 
capital markets--wou1d come fairly rapidly. In Argentina and Uruguay, the 
anti-inflationary policy took precedence over other economic objectives with 
the adoption of the tab1ita in December 1978. In Chile too, bringing down 
inflation became a main concern when the tablita was adopted in ~ebruary 
1978. All three countries also sometimes used tariff reductions to impose 
price discipline rather than to rationalize the trade regime (see Tables 3a, 
3b, 3c below). 
At the time, the exchange-rate-based approach to stabilization 
represented a departure from prevailing orthodoxy. The approach was a 
seductive novelty, and a number of other countries including Brazil, Portugal, 
Turkey and Sri Lanka flirted with it -- hoping, like the Southern Cone 
countries, to avoid the ~ecessionary costs known to accompany orthodox 
stabilization efforts. In contrast to the Southern Cone, countries, however, 
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pragmatic attitudes prevailed elsewhere, and the exchange rate strategy was 
soon abandoned. 
3.3 How Much Liberalization? 
With different timing and intensity, all three countries removed 
price controls, liberalized interest rates, reduced restrictions on commodity 
tr~de and capital flows, and partly deregulated their labor markets. A 
chronological synopsis of reforms roughly classlfied by market for each 
country appears in Tables 3a, 3b and 3c. With the exception of domestic 
financial market deregulation, which proceeded rapidly in all cases, the 
sequencing of the reforms differed in each country. Uruguay removed all 
controls on capital flows and many commodity price controls early on, but 
progressed more slowly on the liberalization of foreign trade (Table 3c). 
Uruguay also rationalized its fiscal system the most, eliminating the lncome 
tax and movlng to a VAT. Chile, on the other hand, went the furthest in 
eliminating domestic price controls and reducing trade barriers, but main-
tained controls on short-term capital flows for a long period (Table 3b). 
Chile also maintained important labor market regulations. Argentina elimin-
ated price controls, and removed most restrictions on medium term (more than 
one year) capital flows, and quantitative import restrictions (with some 
important exceptions) before implementing some ad hoc tariff reductions (Table 
3a). Uruguay virtually eliminated price controls by the end of 1979, but 
adopted only minimal commercial policy reforms to lower protection. 
The evidence on persistently high effective protection to domestic 
sales in Argentina and Uruguay makes it clear that liberalization by no means 
affected all markets. In fact, contrary to popular belief, only Chile 
experienced pervasive and intensified foreign competition; in Argentina and 
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Poll cI as/Year 
A. Stablll z~t Ion 
(I) Monet~ry 
Polley 
(II) Fiscal 
and 
Publl c 
Expend I ture 
Policy 
(III ) Exchange 
Rate 
Policy 
B. L1berallz~tlon 
(I) Domestic 
Product 
Markets 
(II) Taxation 
(III) Labour 
Markets 
(Iv) Ihmestlc 
Financial 
Markets 
(v) Externa I 
Financial 
Flows 
(vi) Commercial 
Policy 
T~ble 3~ 
--cFrTtr 
St~blll z~tlon/LI69r8TTZ8tlon Ma~sures: 
1973 - 1982 
1973/74 
Start of 
sale of 
publl cly 
owned firms 
(500 sold 
by 1979 
1975 
Restr I ct I ve nonetory 
policy to cope with 
1975 BOP crisis 
(Early): Reduction 
of deficit from 
10.5% of GOP to 2.6% 
of GOP I n one year. 
Program I nvo I ved ~n 
across the board cut 
1976 
of 19-20% I n government 
spend I ng on goods and 
services, sale of 
government assets, lind 
Improved tax collection 
(starting Unl fled exchange rate 
Oct 73) 
Multiple 
e)(change nIta 
reduced to 
three-rata 
systems; 300l 
devaluation and 
establl shment 
of crawling peg 
(starting 
Oct 73) 
Many product 
prices 
deregu I ated 
(Early In Year): 
extension of VAT 
coverage; one-year 
surch8rge on 
persona I I ncome tax; 
& 10l consumpt I on 
tax on J uxury goods 
May 74: Interest 
rates freed for 
cap I to I market 
transactions by 
F I ""mel eras. 
Oct 74: Interest 
rates freed for 
commercIal banks. 
(Since 1974 
maximum debt/ 
capital ratio for 
commercial banks 
set at 20) 
Regulations 
governing Inflows 
of externa I funds 
Into Chilean 
banks II ber.11 zed 
Late 1973 to end 
of 1974: New 
government rel1'Oves 
QRs reduces average 
tar I It from 105% to 
69%, rnetxlmum rate 
cut from 750% to 
140% 
New tarl If 
structure 
proposed with 
rates of 25l. 
30% & 35% for 
pr I mary seml-
ml!Inu factured 
and I'I'IOnufactured 
1977 
Oeva luatlon 
amounts 
II nked to 
CPI: 
Inflation 
reduced to 
3-4% a nonth 
1978 
Feb: IItabllta" 
Introduced 
with 
dave luat Ion 
rate above 
nonthTyCP"1 
charge to 
compensate 
for tar Iff 
cuts and 
lower r""tes 
thereafter 
Sept: Commerc I al 
~nks author I zed 
to I ntermed late 
capital Inflows. 
txJt nonthly ceil-
Ing on Inflows 
of 5% of each 
b"nk's capital 
""nd reserves 
Following 
Chile's wi thdraw I 
from the Andean 
Pact effect I ve 
tarl ffs of 10-35% 
proposed; 
Imp lamentation 
by ml d 1977 
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1979 
Labour union 
activity 
generally 
dl ml n I Shed 
slnca 1973. 
Collect I ve 
bargalnl ng 
now authorized 
at plant level 
only. Wage 
floor set at 
previous wage 
I ndexed for 
CP I Increases 
Global Ilml ts 
on externa I 
borrow I ng 
eliminated. 
Controls now 
only overall 
20: 1 ratio of 
borrow I ng to 
capital and 
reserves and 
5% limit on 
monthly Inf lows 
Unl form 
tariff of 
10% (except 
for cars over 
850 cc.) 
1980 
Nominal 
rate 
fl xed at 
ml d 1977 
level 
1981 
Leg I slatlon 
allowing 
workers to 
negotiate 
fringe 
oonsf I ts and 
emp loyers to 
fire workers 
without 
giving cause. 
MI nl mum 
coverage wage 
limited to 
wor kers aged 
21-65 
Apr: Limit 
on monthly 
Inflows 
ell ml nated. 
Only 20:1 
overall 
borrow Ing 
ceiling and 
applicable 
reserve 
requ I rements 
now rata I ned 
1982 
Jan: Fixed r, 
abandoned; 1 
deva I uat Ion. 
Aug: In Itl. 
lIel ean" but 
I ater lid I rty 
float. 
Sept: New ra 
based on h Ig 
dirty float 
with month Iy 
deva I uat I on 
line with CP 
Jun: Wage 
Indexat Ion 
suspended. 
Dec: Leg I s-
lat Ion to 
correct 
distorting 
effect of 
wage floor 
Po II cl es/Year 
A. Stabilization 
(I) Monetary 
Po Ilcy 
(II) Fiscal and 
Public 
Expend I tur e 
Po II cy 
(III) Exchange 
Rate 
Policy 
B. liberalization 
(I) Domestic 
Product 
Markets 
(II) Taxation 
(III) labour 
Markets 
(Iv) Domestl c 
FI nanclal 
Markets 
(v)Externa I 
FI nonc lal 
Flows 
(vi) Commercial 
Poll cy 
1974 
Exchange 
rate for 
cap Ita I 
transactions 
freely 
determl ned: 
passive 
craw II ng peg 
for goods 
transact I cns 
Ju I: 
II berallzatlon 
of domestic 
prices of 
non-essent I a I 
goods begl ns 
(94% of CPI 
hitherto 
controlled) 
Ju I: Remova I 
of persona I 
I ncome and 
I nher I tance 
taxes. 
Corporate 
prof Its tax 
(25% rate) 
established 
with remission 
for exporters I 
reinvested 
profits 
Sept: Gradua I 
II ft I ng of 
Interest 
ceiling on 
peso loans 
Sept: 
II barall zat Ion 
of capital 
market and 
regu I at Ions 
on forel gn 
exchange 
hal dl ngs and 
transactions. 
De Facto 
convert I bl II ty 
of the Peso 
through 
unrestrl cted 
purchase or 
sale of assets 
denoml nated In 
forel gn 
currency 
1975 
May: Es tab II shnent 
of system of 
allocating credit. 
Central Bank to pay 
I nterest on reserve 
required by law. 
Ju I-Dec: 
liberalization 
of 13% of 
CPI goods 
May: Authorl zatlon 
of repatriation of 
earn I ngs, prof Its 
and capl tal by 
foreigners 
Jul: Rel1l)val Jan: Removal 
of export taxes of remaining 
on beef and QRs 
wool. 
Ju I: Remova I 
of some 
administrative 
and finanCial 
restrictions 
on Imports 
ItlDle )0 
IJRUQ'[\'\'T 
Stabllization/l~ation Measures: 
1974 - 1982 
1976 
Feb: 
II barlzatlon 
of prices on 
non -CP I goods 
(except 
rmnopo II es). 
Later In 1976, 
II berlzatlon 
ot another 25~ 
of CPI prices 
MI d Sept: 
Dormstlc 
Interest 
rates 
effectively 
freed: 
Interest 
celli ng 
of 62% 
(Mid year): 
Authorization 
at torelgn 
currency 
tradl ng 
other thlm 
through 
cOml'OOrclot 
banks 
1977 
(Mid year): 
Re laxat Ion of 
banking law 
Ilml tlng 
1978 
Oct: Effective 
90 day 
predeterml not Ion 
of exchange rllte 
by forward sale 
ot 3 month 
Treasury bills 
redeemable In 
US$. Oftlclal 
unl flcatlon at 
forrrer Iy dUi!ll 
to ra I gn exchan ge 
market 
Jul: Raplocoment 
of of flclal 
prlce-fl xing 
agency by new 
agency to prolTDte 
cOrJl)etltlon and 
price f I exl bill ty. 
Aug: LI ber I zatlon 
of another 13~ of 
CPI goods 
Oct: Introduct Ion 
of nil marginal 
reserve requ tre-
ment and 20% 
number of 
financial 
Intermediaries. 
t-bv: ComR'8rclal 
banks perml tted 
to pay Interest 
on c8sh 8ccounts 
un I fled I ega I 
reserve 
requ I rerrent 
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Dec: Initiation 
of tar I If 
reciJctlon 
progrtlm aimed 
at a un I form 
35% tariff 
by 1985 
1979 
Oct: 
Capitol and 
comn-erclal 
market 
foreign 
exchange 
Is unified 
Ma r: Reduct I on 
of list of 
goods/servl ces 
wi th 
adml n I strat I va Iy 
fixed prices 
Nov: Social 
socurlty chllrges 
reduced: bankl n9 
t~l)( ond tax 
can cess Ions to 
exporters 
abolished (see 
above B (I II) and 
B(v). 18~ VAT 
Imposed 
May: Ell ml nation 
of 8.4% banking 
tax and I ega I 
reserve 
requl rement 
(Ear Iy I n Year): 
Removal of 
1980 
Jun: Official 
fl xl ng of 
car prices 
because 0 f 
lack of 
foreign 
oorrpet I t Ion; 
on Iy 29% of 
CPI prices 
and 14% of 
agricultural 
prices stilI 
fixed 
I nterest subs I dl es 
for exports. 
Feb: Acceleration 
of tariff reductions. 
Sept: Further 
tariff cuts. 
Nov: Ellml nation 
of remission of 
profits tox for 
e>q:>orts ~nd of 
subs Idlzed credl t 
to exporters 
1981 1982 
Jan: 
Imposition of 
10% Imp0rt 
surcharge and 
10% Increase 
In Relnteg~ 
Po II c I es/Year 
A. Stabilization 
B. 
(I) Monetary Po II cy 
(and Price 
Controls) 
(I I) F I sca I and Pu b II c 
Expenditure Policy 
(I II ) Exchange Rate 
POlicy 
LI bera Ilzatlon 
(I) CO ... stlc Product 
Markets 
(II) Taxation 
(Ill ) U! bor Markets 
(I v) thrres"tic FI nanclal 
Markets 
tv) External Financial 
Flows. 
(vi) Commercial Policy 
1976 
Apr: Stabilization of 
exchange rates from 
multiple rate SYSTem to 
dua I (convnerct a I and 
f I nanc I a I) rate system 
with fixed but perlod-
I cally adjustable 
parities. 
Dec: Convergence of 
financial and convrercial 
exchange rates. 
Apr: Prices gradually 
II berlzed. 
Arrangerrents rrade for 
periodic adjust...nt 
of nomi na I w~ges. 
May: Prellml nary attempt 
to correct negat I va rea I 
t nTar-eST rates for 
borrow I ng through new 
tax on loans. 
July: Liberalization of 
rules for negotiating 
foreign eXChange loans. 
Apr: Progress I va remova I 
of prior peso deposit 
requirements and of <;Rs 
on Imports. 
~ 
ARGENTI NA 
Stabllization/Ll berallzatlon Measures: 
1977 
March: Imposition of 
120 day pr I ce contro I 
per i cd to reduce 
Inflation. 
Jan: Repeal of earlier 
law that had natlona Ilzed 
bank depos 1 ts. 
FurTher relaxatIon of 
QRs on Imports as 
fore I gn exchange 
reserves increased. 
1976 - 1982 
1978 
Dec: Preannouncememt 
of Peso/USS exchange 
rates up to end-Aug 
1979. 
Oct: Authorltlzatlon of 
use of gold coins In 
bureaux of eXChange. 
Progress I va remova I of 
restrictions on foreign 
exchange trzlOsact t cns; 
from <USS5,OOO (June) to 
<USS20,OOO (Sept). 
Oec: Elimination of prior 
peso depos i t req u I rement 
for financing foreign 
trade. Progress announced 
for reduction of tarl fes 
to 16% average, and 
elimination of exporT 
taxes by 1986. 
1979 
Jan: Preannouncemen-t of 
Peso/USS exchange rates 
up to end-Dec 1979. 
Oct: Preannoucement of 
Peso/USS exchange rate 
for Jan 1980, and of 
torrru I a for de'termi n i n9 
future month-by-month 
rates .. 
Prices progressively 
decontrolled till 1982. 
Wages progress I ve Iy 
decontro II ed t II I 1982. 
1980 
Sept: Announcement of 1 ~ 
deva lua1"lon for OCTober 
1980 and follOWing months. 
Dec: An nouncernanT 0 f 
Peso/US$ buy-sell rates 
tor Oec 1980-l>4ar 1981. 
Feb: Introduction of Apr: GuaranTee on 
fractional reserve deposits r!lised. 
requl raments for 
flnanci!ll institutions: 
extension of CenTral Bank 
guarantee of deposits 
to a II author' zed 
105tltu1"lon5. 
Jun: 1978 tarl ff 
reduction program 
acee I erated. 
1981 1982 
July: Imposition of 100% 
reserve requ I rerrents 
for bank deposits and 
reg.. I ated cred I t 
a Il000ances .. 
Ju Iy: Rei n'traducTlon of 
dua I eXChange raTe system. 
('Y) 
N 
July/Aug: Attempt to obtain 
YO lun"tary pr I cas/wages 
agreement. 
May / June: Guarantee on 
depos I ts lowered. 
Sept: Authorization to sell 
foreign exchange obtained 
from exports on commercl a 1 
(85S) and financial (15%) 
markeTS. 
Uruguay, where liberalization was much less widespread, pressure from foreign 
competition was only felt at the height of real exchange rate overvaluation. 
Fo~ example, in Uruguay redundant protection was only eliminated in 1981 (see 
Table 3c and Figure 1). At that time the bias against export sales was still 
10/ 35%. 
Rapid and pervasive deregulation of domestic financial markets was a 
common feature of the reforms 1n all three countries. Prior to deregulation, 
non-price allocation of credit and strongly negative real interest rates had 
been widespread and longstanding. The reforms began by progressively 
eliminating ceilings on interest rates, and then reduced restrictions on 
financial intermediaries. Argentina went from 100 percent reserve 
requirements and directed credit programs to a decentralized fractional 
reserve system. The Chilean government began by loosening its control of the 
financial system by allowing non-bank intermediaries to operate without 
interest rate controls. Then, over several years, it removed interest rate 
ceilings for commercial banks and returned state owned commercial banks to the 
private sector. In Uruguay, dollar deposits were legalized and directed 
credit programs were progressively dismantled starting 1n 1974. Later, 1n 
1977, controls on entry to the banking system were also lifted. 
With respect to international capital flows, the sequencing and speed 
of reforms differed from country to country. Uruguay legalized unrestricted 
movements of private capital as early as 1974 and reached full convertibility 
by early 1977. Argentina eliminated most controls on capital movements in 
L979. Chile progressively deregulated medium-term capital flows, eliminating 
global limits on borrowing in 1979 and restrictions on monthly inflows in 
April 1980. Restrictions on short-term capital inflows were not dismantled 
until late 1981, however. 
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Finally, in all three countries, there was relatively little 
liberalization of labor markets. These markets continued to be controlled 
through penalties or prohibitions on labor dismissals, together with 
legislated wages and/or wage indexation. Thus, while the weakening of trade 
union power in the early stages of the reforms amounted to a degree of de 
facto deregulation, no Southern Cone country followed the prescription 1n 
Section 2 for enhancing labor mobility. 
With respect to the sequencing of liberalization and stabilization 
respectively, the three countries followed the appropriate sequence (i.e., 
beginning with stabilization): this was especially clear in Chile and 
Argentina. When one examines the order of reforms within the liberalization 
phase, however, some significant departures from Section 2 prescriptions 
become apparent. Argentina and especially Uruguay deregulated capital flows 
early on. Here the Uruguayan experience is particularly interesting since 
none of the perverse side-effects (e.g. real exchange rate appreciation) 
suggested by proponents of a sequencing starting with current account 
deregulation was observed so long as the exchange rate was not used to bring 
down inflation. Indeed the contractionary effects associated with orthodox 
stabilization was avoided because of capital repatriation (de Melo 1986). 
With high capital mobility, the maintenance of a stable real exchange rate 
with the passive crawl was a key to improved growth during 1974-78 -- though 
other factors, including higher savings and investment rates than in the pre-
reform period, also helped. 11/ Though the sequence of liberalization was 
reversed in Uruguay, following the recommendation of maintaining a stable real 
exchange rate avoided the appearance of macroeconomic disequilibria. 
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To sum up, along with the lifting of domestic price controls, the 
most extensively implemented liberalization program in all three countries was 
th~ deregulation of financial markets. This is not surprising: one might 
reasonably expect much less resistance from threatened interes~ groups to the 
reduction of restrictions in this area than, say, to reduction of trade 
barriers or removal of protective labor market regulations (where, as just 
noted, very little was indeed done). Eventually all three countries also 
decontrolled short-term external capital flows -- a liberalization measure 
rarely carried out 1n developing countries -- but only Uruguay adopted a fully 
liberalized regime 1n this area. Finally 1n foreign trade, only Chile 
virtually eliminated protection. 
As the chronological summary 1n Tables 3a, 3b and 3c shows, 
deregulation was usually gradual. The exceptions were the rapid removal of 
capftal flows restrictions in Argentina and especially in Uruguay, and the 
rapid sale of public enterprises in Chile. Otherwise domestic prices were 
decontrolled gradually, interest rate ceilings were lifted slowly and trade 
liberalization in Chile took place over a five year period. On the whole, 
th~refore, the reform process cannot be criticized for its abruptness; indeed, 
tr~de liberalization in Argentina and Uruguay was, if anything, too little, 
too late, and too slow. 
4. Lessons from Reform Implementation 
The first lesson is that during the orthodox stabilization phase, 
when markets were being liberalized and inflation was being reduced through an 
exchange rate policy designed to maintain an "appropriate" parity, the three 
Southern Cone economies did well by historical standards. The turnaround in 
Uruguay was the most dramatic of the three. Years of stagnation during the 
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import-substitution phase gave way to eight years of rapid growth, during 
which the budget deficit (3.2% of GOP in the 1971-73 period) was progressively 
reduced, reaching 1.9 percent of GOP in 1977-78. But inflation only fell from 
a historic peak of 62.7% in the 1971-73 period to 51% by the end of this 
orthodox stabilization phase. In Chile, despite the 1975 recession when GOP 
fell 13% (mainly because of a sharp external shock), the initial stabilization 
program was also successful. The government budget was turned around from a 
deficit of 9.3% of GOP during 1971-73 to a 1.2 percent surplus by 1977-78, and 
inflation fell from 150% to 79%. Only in Argentina, was growth never restored 
to the rates achieved during the period of import-substitution-led industri-
alization. 
The second lesson relates to the coordination of appropriate macro 
policies with liberalization efforts. Argentina never reduced its fiscal 
deficit below 8% of GOP, and meanwhile pursued mutually inconsistent exchange 
rate and monetary policies. This was especially the case during the tablita 
phase, when the deficit fed the growing expectations of devaluation during 
1980 -- which are in turn reflected in the interest rate trajectory 1n Figure 
1. The collapse of Argentina's exchange rate regime has been throughly 
studied [Cumby and van Wijnbergen (forthcoming) and ConnoLLy (1985)]. It is 
now clear that borrowing abroad to finance the fiscal deficit and monetization 
of non-performing commerciaL bank loans were inconsistent with the tabLita and 
that the Liberalization episode was doomed from the start because of 
inconsistent macro poLicies. 12/ 
The third lesson has to do with the pursuit of exchange-rate-based 
stabilization. In terms of inflation alone, the second stabilization phase 
uLtimately achieved its goaL. In Chile, inflation feLL from an annuaL rate of 
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35% in 1978 (II) to -1% in 1982 (II); in Uruguay, from 49% 1n 1978 (II) to 23% 
in 1982 (III); and in Argentina, from 161% in 1978 (IV) to 72% 1n 1981 (1). 
But all three economies eventually collapsed (see Figure 1) and had to abandon 
their exchange rate policy. Indeed, it is the disastrous Southern Cone 
experience with exchange-rate-based stabilization that has prompted tOday's 
growing consensus against adoption of a similar strategy elsewhere. Figure 1 
corroborates Diaz-Alejandro's (1981) concern about this approach -- that it 
was slow to work through into the commodity and financial markets, but 
meanwhile created large capital movements and strong real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
In all three countries capital inflows were initially large. In 
Argentina and Uruguay, the opening of the capital account when substantial 
restrictions were still operating on commodity trade prompted large and sudden 
portfolio adjustments, which produced large capital inflows. This fueled 
private expenditures, which resulted in strong currency appreciation, followed 
by outflows when appreciation appeared clearly unsustainable. This capital 
flight in turn aggravated the recession. In Chile, meanwhile, where trade 
restrictions had been lifted, backward wage indexation contributed to an 
unwanted (and unwarranted) real exchange rate appreciation (Corbo, 1985b). 
The boom-squeeze-bust sequence during the second stabilization phase 
1S clearly illustrated in Figure 1. Initially, a "boom" occurs, in part 
because of the fall in the real interest rate (which turned negative in 
Argentina and Uruguay), in part because of a perceived increase in wealth. In 
Chile real interest rates always remained positive, partly because of the 
remaining controls on the term structure of capttal inflows. In all three 
countries, however, large capital inflows created a strong feeling of euphoria 
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Figure 1: Real Exchange Rates and Real Interest Rates 
During the Actiye Crawling Peg. 
Argentina Chil e Uruguay 
m_ ...... __ ..... ~_....-
1977 1982 1917 1982 1977 1982 
___ Real Exchange Rate (1978.4 = 100 )scnatey QdtuSted reat gdI:I (1978.4 = 1(0) 
--- Ex-post Real Interest Rate (annual lending rate: 5-quarter moving average 
...... Seasonally Adjusted Real GDP (1978-4 = 100) 
NOTES: Real Exchange Rate Index on right hand scale 
Real Interest Rate and GDP index on left hand scale 
29 
as their real exchange rate appreciated and purchasing power swelled. This 
euphoric phase was akin to the stages of financial crisis described in 
Kindleberger (1978) and alluded to by Diaz-Alejandro (1985): as leverage 
increases, financial structures become more fragile and agents are induced to 
shift their portfolios towards dollar-denominated debt (Tybout, 1986). 
Next comes the "squeeze" as real interest rates increase sharply, in 
part because of rising expectations that the tablita will be abandoned. The 
squeeze thus produced by higher financial costs is aggravated by a squeeze 
from falling earnings as competition from abroad intensifies because of the 
strong real currency appreciation. Agents now respond with increased 
borrowing to stave off bankruptcy, and await a postdevaluation bailout (Diaz-
Alejandro, 1985). 
Finally comes the "bust" phase: banks and firms face insolvency 
while capital flees the country as the collapse of the exchange rate regime 
becomes imminent. In all three countries, the response was a series of 
inflationary measures to bailout insolvent banks and firms, complemented by 
governmental assumption of privately contracted debt. 13/ 
How much of this pattern of apparently (with hindsight) inevitable 
debacle was due to faulty policies, how much to external events? Below we 
give a partial account. 
5. How Important Were External Shocks? 
As mentioned in the Introduction, it has been claimed that most of 
the problems that Chile and Uruguay faced in the early 1980s were due to 
unfavorable external conditions (Sjaastad (1982), (1983». Here we attempt to 
quantify roughly, in a general equilibrium framework, the contribution of 
external and domestic factors to output growth and debt accumulation. 
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A small macro model is estimated with annual data (1962-83) 
separately for the three countries and lS presented in the Appendix. It 
builds on Caballero and Corbo (1985). Here we use Hayashi's (1982) technique 
to specify the expenditure function with a fraction of the population 
liquidity constrained [Caballero (1986)]. This gives us two elements: an 
expectational error that provides some idea of the magnitude of the unexpected 
component of the growing bubble during the boom-and-bust sequence described 
above; and disposable income as a way to capture the direct effects of 
external shocks (terms of trade and interest rates) on expenditure. 
To isolate the importance of external shocks, we disaggregate the 
model into five goods: exportables (manufacturing and nonmanufacturing); 
importables (oil and non-oil); and nontradables. Two-stage budget allocation 
determines demand for goods. 14/ On the production side, supply functions 
come from optimization with ad-hoc lags to capture adjustment dynamics. 
Identities implied by the general equilibrium feature of the model allow us to 
determine nontradable prices and hence the real exchange rate. Finally a 
Philips curve reflects wage stickiness. This implies that a sudden contra-
ction after a boom may have strong real effects because of increases in 
unemployment caused by rising real labor costs. 
Below we report preliminary simulation runs for each country for the 
1981-83 period, but on the hypothesis of no external shocks {which we model by 
maintaining the national accounts terms-of-trade index at its value for 1980 
-- a good year -- and by assum1ng interest rates at their level in the late 
seventies}. The general conclusion is that only a small part of the peor 
performance during the early eighties was due to unfavorable external 
conditions. 
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5.1 Chile 
We find that even if the terms of trade of 1980 and the international 
interest rate of the period 1974-79 had been in place ln the 1981-83 period, 
GOP growth would have been only 2.1 percent per year, and by the end of 1982 
the debt would have still been 15.9 billion dollars <the historical value 
given in Table 4 was 18.2 billion). 
Thus, according to our model, even without external shocks, the 
performance of the Chilean economy in the 1981-83 period would have been much 
worse than in the 1976-80 period. Critical causal factors include the drop ln 
the real exchange rate, the increase in real wages, and the slow capital 
accumulation during 1976-80, all of which slowed GOP growth. 
Consider now the likely outcome if expenditure had not been allowed 
to grow so rapidly. The outcome of this simulation, with no external shock 
but with expenditure following a "more normal path", is average GOP growth of 
2.7% during 1981-83 and external debt of only 12.2 billion dollars. 15/ This 
more favorable outcome is achieved by the following mechanisms. With a normal 
expenditure path, growth would have been less in 1981 but borrowing and real 
wage lncreases would also have been less. Lower real wages would have raised 
employment and benefited production, especially in the nontradable sector. 
Production of nontradables would have also benefited from the higher dispos-
able income available with lower interest payments. 
Robustness is added to these results by performing the same 
experiment but instead assumlng the actual trajectory of the terms of trade 
and interest rates. Now the average drop in GOP would have been only -0.9 
percent per year and the Level of debt only 12.9 billion dollars: These 
results compare very favorably with the actual GOP and debt trajectories. 
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Table 4: 
Terms of Trade, GOP and Debt: 1980-83 
Argentina Chi Ie Uru~ 
Terms GOP Externa I Terms GOP Externa I Terms GOP External 
of 1/ Debt of 1/ Debt of J.! Debt 
Trade Trade Trade 
1980 1.0 1.00 30.2 1.00 1.00 11.0 1.00 1.00 1.1 
1981 1.14 0.94 39.4 0.90 1.06 14.7 1.04 1.02 1.4 
1982 0.87 0.89 43.6 0.80 0.91 17.4 1.04 0.92 1.7 
1983 0.95 0.92 46.0 0.80 0.90 18.2 1.16 0.87 2.5 
J.! - National Account Terms of Trade: 1980 = 1.0 
- External Debt in Billions of US$s 
- GOP, rea I index: 1980 ::: 1.0 
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Indeed, 1980-83 average GOP growth was only -3.4 percent and the debt at the 
end of 1983 was 18.2 billion dollars (Table 4). 
5.2 Argentina 
Large fluctuations and lack of data account for less preClse model 
estimation in this case. Hence we concentrate on simulations dealing with the 
magnitude of external shock effects. In Argentina too, we find that external 
shocks only account for a fraction of the recession. 
As indicated in Table 4, Argentina's historic average annual growth 
rate for the 1980-83 period was -3.2 and debt accumulation was 15.8 billion 
dollars. The external shock was less important than for Chile -- first, 
because the terms of trade did not fall by much and second, because the 
debt/GOP ratio was much smaller. 
Our simulation shows that had Argentina faced in 1982 and 1983 the 
favorable 1981 terms of trade (see Table 4) and the average interest rate of 
the late seventies, GOP growth would instead have been 0.7% a year and debt 
would have decreased by 4.2 billion dollars during 1981-83. Argentina's 
capacity to borrow would certainly have increased, giving her the option of 
delaying the looming macroeconomic crlS1S. 
Further confirmation of the latent crlS1S comes from the 1981 
receSSlon when the terms of trade were 14 percent higher than in 1980, a good 
year. It is true that the interest bill doubled from 1980 to 1981 but our 
simulation suggests that this would only have produced a 1 percent effect on 
growth and a 1.5 billion dollar accumulation of foreign debt for 1981. Hence, 
even with favorable interest rates in 1981, output would have fallen by 5.3 
percent in 1981 and borrowing would have been 7.7 billion dollars. The roots 
of Argentina's crisis lay elsewhere. 
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5.3 Uruguay 
For Uruguay too, unfavorable external shocks only explain part of the 
country's poor performance during the early 1980s. Analyzing the external 
shock effect for Uruguay presents special problems because of the proximity of 
Buenos Aires and Montevideo (which makes expenditures very sensitive to 
changes in the bilateral exchange rate between the two countries). The terms 
of trade rose during 1980-83, giving the impression (in addition to the 
international interest rates effect) of a positive external shock. This is 
misleading, however, because the terms of trade measure includes the fall in 
the relative price of Argentine goods following the large devaluations 1n 
Argentina 1n 1981, 1982 and 1983 while Uruguay maintained its tablita. (Even 
Uruguayan barbers faced a very elastic demand with respect to the exchange 
rate with Argentina, and this is not registered as an import (or export) in 
balance of payments accounting.) Expenditure on domestic goods fell because 
of this real appreciation vis-a-vis Argentina. 
With this caveat 1n mind, the simulations only capture the interest 
rate effect. The simulation glves rates of growth of GDP that are 0.3 and 2.2 
percentage points higher than the historic -9.4 and -5.9 for 1982 and 1983, 
respectively. The level of debt would have been only 122 million dollars less 
by the end of 1983. We conclude that the interest rate shock was not 
important, although Uruguay certainly suffered from Argentina's instability. 
This is not to say that the effect of this instability could not have been 
dampened had Uruguay formulated her exchange rate policy to take into account 
her real exchange rate with Argentina. 
35 
6., Conclusions 
This paper has reassessed Southern Cone reforms in terms of the 
different causes of failure mentioned 1n the introduction. The historical 
record suggests that reforms were not as widespread as some believed, 
although they were large in relation to the status quo ante. In particular, 
our synopsis shows that very little trade liberalization took place in 
Argentina and Uruguay, where redundant protection was barely eliminated at the 
height of real exchange rate overvaluation. Some of the anti-export bias was 
reduced by eliminating taxes on traditional exports, but it remained high 
thoughout the reforms, as did average effective protection to domestic sales 
and its variance across sectors. Furthermore, labor markets remained fairly 
highly regulated in all three countries, even though labor dismissal was 
easier than before the reforms. The synopsis also suggests that, by and 
large, liberalization was gradual. Even the relatively rapid trade 
liberalization in Chile still spanned five years. 
Our reassessment suggests several errors of program design and 
implementation. Relatively restrictive wage legislation (Chile) or political 
in~tability combined with a preoccupation with rising unemployment (Argentina) 
impeded the resource reallocation process prompted by commodity market 
liberalization. Liberalization measures were also thwarted by poorly designed 
macro policies. This was particularly important in Argentina throughout the 
reform period (and in Uruguay towards its end), when the monetary policy to 
deal with growing fiscaL deficits was inconsistent with the accompanying 
exchange rate policy. 
Finally we have provided a rough quantification of the contribution 
of terms-of-trade and interest rate shocks to the collapse of the three 
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economies in the early eighties. We found that in no case were external 
shocks the most important explanatory variables. For Chile we also showed 
that the recession would have been greatly reduced had the macro policies that 
fueled private expenditures been avoided. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ Other recent analyses of stabilization and liberalization policies [e.g. 
Killick (1984) and Ching-Yuan Lin (1985)] have shown that simultaneous 
application of the two is unlikely to be sustainable and successful. 
2/ The view that real exchange rate appreciation to bring down inflation 
should be avoided owes much to Southern Cone experience with this 
policy. See Section 4. 
3/ For infant industries a timetable of reduction in protection over, say, a 
five year period should be adhered to. See Balassa (1976) and Bell, Ross-
Larson and Westphal (1985). And, for countries with export earnings 
derived from natural-resource-based products, it is appropriate and 
accepted to tax windfall gains during commodity booms and to offer rebates 
to producers during troughs. See Davis (1983). 
4/ Lessons from interviews with manufacturing firm managers in the Southern 
Cone countries are summarized in Corbo and de Melo (1985b). They found 
that major efficiency gains were achieved in a short period for some firms 
but that others delayed adjustment because of lack of belief in the 
reforms. 
5/ Much h2s been written 1n the last three years on this topic. Our purpose 
here is to summarize the main reforms. This section draws mostly on 
Corbo, de Melo and Tybout (1986) and Corbo and de Melo (1985). Other 
references are Calvo (1986), Edwards (1985), Harberger (1982), Rodriguez 
(1982) and Sjaastad (1983). 
6/ The introduction of crawling peg exchange rate regimes, in the mid 1960s 
in Chile and later in Uruguay (1972) and Argentina did reduce the more 
extreme fluctuations in the real exchange rate, but imbalances persisted. 
7/ Annual inflati.on rates approached 1,000 percent in Chile (September 1973) 
2,300 percent in Argentina (March 1976) and 100 percent in Uruguay. The 
fiscal deficits were substantial well before the coLlapse of the civilian 
governments (Table 2). In Argentina and Chile inefficient public enter-
prises contributed to high public sector deficits. 
8/ Chile's rate of inflation was around 50 percent in late 1977, Argentina's 
was l66 percent in late 1978, and Uruguay's was roughly 50 percent in late 
1978. 
9/ How exchange-rate-based stabilization was supposed to work is described 1n 
Rodriguez (1983). Comparisons of the two approaches is provided in 
Dornbusch (1982). 
10/ For further discussion see Nogu~s (1986) Petrei and de Me10 (1985) on 
Argentina and Mezzera and de Melo (1985) on Uruguay. 
11/ Controlling for other factors, de Melo and Tybout (1986) showed that 
savings and investment rose during the reform period. However, they could 
not attribute this rise to financial market reforms only and suggested 
that fiscal reforms played an important role. 
12/ The same inconsistency appeared in Uruguay in 1981-82 when the fiscal 
deficit reappeared and was financed by external borrowing. 
13/ Diaz-Alejandro (1985) perceptively analyzed the moral hazard issues 
associated with this financial liberalization without supervision 1n his 
1985 paper. Lessons from Southern Cone domestic financial market 
deregualtion are summarized in Tybout (1986). 
14/ The second stage expenditure allocation uses a CES utility function. 
15/ By "more normal path" we understand a path where the unexpected growth in 
the "bubble" (as defined earlier> is zero. Moreover, we assume that 
expenditure followed the perfect foresight path after 1980. 
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Appendix 
General Equilibrium Model of 
Balances of Trade and Services 
Al. Model Equations 
Expenditure 
(1) C = a C + ~(DY - a DY 1) + e 00- t 
Imports (P~ = OILM Poil + NOM PNO ) 
(2) log(NOM) = a
o 
+ (1/(1-a 1» (log(Pc ) - log(PNO » + logE 
Exports (P
x 
X = PXNM ~+ PXM XM) 
(3) log(XNM) = Y01 - y 11 (10g(W) - 10g(PXNM » -
Y21(log(P~NM) - 10g(PXNM » + ~NM 
(4) log(XM) = Y02 - y l2 (log(W) ~ log(PXM » -
Y22(log(P~) - log(PXM » + ~ 
Non-Tradable Price and Phillips Curve 
(5) log(PN) = 001 log(W) + (1 - 0 01 )log(PM) 
+ 0 14 (log(E) - ~) 
(6) ~log(W) = 002 + ~log(Pc) + 0 12 (log(Y) - log(N» 
Deflator and Basic Identifiers 
(7) log(P) = ~olog(PN) + ~1log(PX) + (1 - ~O - ~l) log(Poi1 ) 
(8) B - P
x 
X - PM M 
(9) Y _ [EP + Blip 
c 
(10) DY = [PY - INT]/P 
c 
Price Definitions 
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(12) 10g(P~NM) = ~2210g(POIL) + ~22log(PNO) + (1-~12-~22)10g(PN) 
(13) log(P~) = ~13log(POIL) + ~23log(PNO) + (1-~13~23)log(PN) 
(14) 10g(PM) = ~1410g(POIL) + (1 - ~14)log(PNO) 
(15) 10g(PX) = ~15log(PXM) + (1 - ~15)log(PXNM) 
Where ~ is the log difference operator and the subscript index -1 means one 
period lag and 
c 
DY 
PM 
M 
OILM: 
POlL: 
NOM 
PNO 
P : 
c 
E 
w 
Private consumption plus investment (per capita). 
disposable income (per capita) 
Expectational error (orthogonal to information available at t-l) 
imports price 
imports volume 
oil imports 
oil price 
non-oil imports 
non-oil import price 
Private consumption (plus investment) deflator. 
total expenditure 
exports prlce 
exports volume 
nonmanufacture exports 
nonmanfuacture exports price 
manufacture exports 
manufacture exports price 
nominal wage 
input price in nonmanufacture exports 
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pl 
XM input price ln manufacture exports 
kXNM: log of capital in nonmanufacture exports 
kXM : log of capital ln manufacture exports 
kN: log of capital in nontradables 
PN nontradeable prlce 
N population 
P GDP deflator 
B Balance of trade 
y GDP 
INT interest payments (abroad) 1n local currency 
A2. Data and Estimation 
Data are from national accounts and IFS. The estimation period 1S 
1962-83. Dynamic structure and dummy variables are not reported here. 
Instrumental variables (for expenditure equation) and FIML were applied. 
Simulations are dynamic. 
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Economic Liberalisation and Its Impact on Agriculture: 
The Case of Australia 
R.G.Gregory 
Australian National University, GPO Box 4, Canberra, ACT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Australian agricultural sector has always been consistent in its approach to 
economic liberalization. It has favoured liberalization when it appears to be in the 
agricultural sector's interest and opposed it when it has not. 
Thus a decade ago, if a farm lobbyist was called upon to deliver an address in favour of 
economic liberalization the response would be fairly predictable. The address would 
stress the need for trade liberalization, first in terms of increased access to overseas 
markets and second in terms of tariff reductions on manufacturing imports. The idea that 
tariffs impose a cost on a rural export sector, both directly through the increase in input 
costs and indirectly through the effect of the trade restrictions on the real exchange rate 
are ideas that go back in Australia at least to the Brigden Report of the 1920s. As an 
aside the lobbyist might also include a reference to the need to deregulate the labour 
market as it relates to the rural sector but such a remark was rather unlikely. 
Liberalization was generally thought to be a good thing for agriculture. 
There are other issues which relate to regulation and liberalization and which were 
unlikely to have been mentioned in the address. For example, there is a wide range of 
regulatory measures introduced by governments which are seen to favour agriculture and 
which most participants in the sector would not wish to see liberalized. I am referring 
here to the special assistance agriculture receives from the taxation system and the 
activities of numerous marketing authorities (See Sieper, 1982). In addition the farm 
sector has not been in the forefront of arguing for a deregulated transport system or for 
selling off public utilities such as Telecom. The degree of cross subsidies delivered to 
the farm sector by public authorities appears to be quite considerable (see Kolsen, 1983). 
Today, an address by a farm lobbyist is likely to much more complicated and wider in its 
economic scope. The liberalization debate has become more complex because 
increasingly the agricultural sector has come to realize that there are many links between 
policy for other areas of the economy and the rural sector. The understanding of these 
links in Australia was helped along considerably by the sorts of analysis that were 
undertaken over the last decade on the rapid development of the mineral sector. Thus, 
in a paper delivered to a conference of your Australian counterparts a decade ago, I 
pointed out that the rapid development of mineral exports was more important to the 
exporting agricultural sector than any conceivable tariff liberalization on the horizon 
(Gregory, 1976). The simple argument is well understood now. Any large increase in 
exports from one sector will affect the real exchange rate and therefore reduce the 
competitiveness of other exporting sectors. Once these connections are realized the 
agricultural sector comes to have a direct interest in government policy towards the 
mineral sector. The arguments that were well understood with respect to the effects of 
*1 have benefited considerably from discussions with W. Martin of the BAE and the Australian National 
University. 
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tariffs on the rural sector have a symmetry with respect to the export developments in 
other sectors. The model I presented was firmly in the tradition of the real theory of 
international trade. 
The models utilized today, however, increasingly seem to be moving out of the old 
fashioned real theories of international trade and into the newer financial and monetary 
models of exchange rate determination. The current debate, for example, often relates 
the interests of rural exporters to government deficits, interest rates and monetary 
policy, taxation reforms and so on. 
In the following pages I will begin with the old issues of liberalization, then discuss 
recent developments in the Australian balance of payments and finally move on to more 
current issues. 
2. THE OLD ISSUES 
Tariff Liberalisation 
It is now widely accepted in Australia that the old industry policy of increasing levels of 
protection for manufacturing to enable the growth of industry behind tariff walls is 
entirely inappropriate. Attitudes began to change towards the end of the sixties and the 
first signs of this new approach were the creation of the lAC in January 1973, the 25 
per cent across the board tariff reduction of July 1973, and lower levels of protection for 
a number of industries such as white goods and electronics. Since 1975 progress has 
been slower. Generally speaking, low tariffs have been reduced further, but in response 
to the 1975 economic downturn a number of industries were protected by import quotas 
which have not been liberalized to any significant extent. 
Until recently the effective tariff equivalent of these quotas protecting the motor vehicle, 
textiles, footwear and clothing industries has steadily risen with quite dramatic effects 
on the level of protection. (See Table 1). For Transport equipment, for example, the 
level of effective tariff protection increased to 72 per cent. For Clothing and Footwear 
the increases were even more startling; the effective tariff rate at 1982-83 is estimated to 
be 200 percent. In each instance the principal source of the increase was the restrictive 
effects of the quotas. 
The present Labour government has been designing industry plans for these industries 
and a central feature of each plan has been the intention of further tariff reductions. Thus, 
for the motor vehicle industry, the plan calls for the replacement of quotas by tariffs and 
after an increase of the out of quota nominal tariff to 90 per cent a planned general 
reduction of the nominal tariff level to 60 per cent by 1992. Similar considerations will 
probably be built into the plans for the Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Industries. 
Although these target tariffs are likely to be high by pre 1975 standards, they will 
probably involve a significant reduction from present levels. 
There are, however, a number of clouds on the horizon. First, it seems fairly clear the 
the level of unemployment will increase over the next year or so. Whether the Cabinet 
will be able to proceed with tariff reductions in this climate is not clear. The left wing and 
the union elements of the Labor party do not believe that the government has done 
enough for manufacturing industry. In an environment of increasing unemployment the 
political strength of those favouring a more interventionist policy is likely to increase and 
the outcome may well be to reduce the extent of future tariff liberalization, and indeed, 
on balance, to increase the degree of support against imports. Second, the very rapid 
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Table 1: AVERAGE EFFECfIVE RATES OF ASSISTANCE a MANUF ACfURING 
SUR-DIVISIONS: 1968-69 TO 1982-83 (per cent) 
ASIC Sub-Division 1968-69 1974-75 1975-76 1977-78 1978-79 1982-83 
21 Food, beverages 16 21 20 13 10 9 
and tobacco 
23 Textiles 43 37 50 57 47 54 
24 Clothing & Footwear 97 71 99 149 141 200 
25 Wood, wood products 26 18 19 18 18 13 
and furniture 
26 Paper & paper products 52 32 30 29 24 24 
printing & publishing 
27 Chemical, petroleum and 31 26 26 18 19 14 
coal products 
28 Non-metallic mineral 15 10 10 5 5 4 
products 
29 Basic metal products 31 21 16 12 10 11 
31 Fabricated metal products 61 41 38 32 30 27 
32 Transport equipment 50 42 59 61 48 72 
33 Other machinery and 43 28 25 21 20 18 
equipment 
34 Miscellaneous manuf. 34 25 26 27 30 25 
-, 
TOTAL MANUFACI1JRlNG 36 28 28 26 23 25 
a 
. The estimates from 1%8-69 to 1981-82 are in three series: 1968-69 to 197-75; 1974-75; 1975-76; 
1977-78; and 1978-82. The first series is based upon 1968-69 production weights; t he second 
series uses 1974-75 production weights; and the third series employs 1977-78 production weights 
and also incorporates fonns of assistance not included in previous series estimates. 
Source: Assistance to Manufacturing Industry 1977-78 to 1982-83, Industries Assistance 
Commission Annual Report, 1980-81; Annual Report 1976-77. 
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growth of a substantial current account deficit in the balance of payments has emerged 
as the number one policy problem in Australia and policies to increase imports are likely 
to be postponed in this environment. Third, in the short run, almost all the industry 
plans involve increases in industry assistance, but the instruments of assistance are not 
always directly imposed against imports. For example, the new $90 million heavy 
engineering assistance package is focused on training and concessional loan finance. 
Whether packages such as these will lead to more defacto protection against imports in 
the long run is not as yet clear. Fourth, there is growing pressure on the Federal 
government to increase the preference for Australian products as a part of a government 
procurement policy. This could quite easily lead to increases in protection for Australian 
manufacturers against imports. At this stage though there has been some progress 
towards lower protection as state preferences are to be abolished but whether the federal 
levels of industry assistance that will be embodied in government preference for local 
products will be lower remains to be seen. Fifth, the Liberal party appears to have 
remained a high tariff party. For example, their last plan for the motor vehicle 
industry, just before losing office, was based on further increases in tariffs from the 
high levels of that time of around 80 to 90 per cent to a tariff level of 150 percent and 
then steadily reducing to 125 percent by 1992. We will have to wait and see whether 
their policy has changed along with the growing strength of the right wing of the party. 
Despite these clouds, however, at this stage the tendency in Australia is quite clearly 
towards lower tariffs but the speed of tariff reduction is likely to be slow. 
Over the last decade and half not only has Australia enjoyed lower levels of tariff 
protection but perhaps more importantly with the exception of those industries protected 
by quotas we have avoided increases of tariffs. The net result has been that imports have 
been allowed to increase as a proportion of GDP and the share of manufacturing output 
in GDP has fallen. This has been reflected in the employment figures. In 1966 
manufacturing employed about 30 per cent of the Australian workforce. Today that 
proportion is around 16 per cent. It is clear that over the last decade the balance of 
protection policies has allowed a substantial increase in the level of imports and, as a 
result of the effect on the real exchange rate, cost conditions have been made easier for 
those parts of the rural sector that export. 
Regulations in agriculture 
While the average rate of assistance applying to rural industries is relatively low, a small 
group of industries have received quite high nominal and effective rates of assistance 
(lAC, 1983). These industries, which are generally labour intensive, and heavily 
oriented towards the domestic market, include eggs, dairying (particularly the market 
milk sector), tobacco and citrus. The majority of the assistance provided to these 
industries is obtained by transfers from domestic consumers, rather than through direct 
assistance measures. 
Marketing arrangements for eggs and dairy products, in particular, have received close 
scrutiny in the past decade, partly because of the extent of the transfers, partly because of 
the inefficiencies in the marketing arrangements, and partly because of the oversupply 
problems which arise from the equalisation approaches used. Some progress has been 
made in rationalising the inefficiencies in the marketing arrangements for these 
commodities and reducing the extent of transfers, although reform of these arrangements 
has proven extremely difficult. The involvement of both state and federal governments 
in these arragements and the need to obtain a consensus on any major reforms provides a 
brake on any rapid changes to the arrangements. 
Costs of regulation have also emerged as a major issue in the handling of wheat and 
sugar cane. It is argued that the highly regulated marketing systems for these industries 
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do not always provide the appropriate incentives to minimize costs (BAE 1985, p. 26). 
Some deregulation of wheat trade for feed purposes has already occurred, and a Royal 
Commission into wheat handling and costs has been announced. Reform of the myriad 
regulations applying to sugar cane production and processing has proved extraordinarily 
difficult, despite evidence that relaxation of controls could benefit the sugar industry by 
around $146 million per year (BAE 1985, p. 26). 
3. THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Over the last year the balance of payments has increasingly become the centre of 
economic policy concerns. Before discussing in detail the implications of this we will 
first outline the longer term trends in the balance of payments over the last two decades 
and then move onto the more immediate environment. 
The Longer Term Trends 
Exports 
The balance of payments in Australia over the last two decades has been dominated by 
the rapid growth of mineral exports. The changing structure of our exports can be seen 
from Figure 1. The contribution of the rural sector has continued to shrink. The 
increase of mineral exports is substantial. For example, purely as a mechanical 
calculation, if mineral exports had remained at their 1970 proportions of total exports and 
rural exports had grown instead of minerals then the volume of rural exports would 
have increased by about 50 percent and the farm sector would have faced an exceptional 
decade. Of course this exaggerates the possible outcome because for some products such 
as wool increased volumes could not be sold without substantial price falls. 
As might be expected the rural sector's shrinking share of economic activity has also 
affected employment in the rural sector. There has been a dramatic decline in full time 
employment of male farmers, a rapid increase in the number of women who describe 
themselves as farmers and continued growth of off farm income and employment. 
Imports 
As indicated above, imports have significantly increased their share of Australian 
expenditure. Since the first three years at the beginning of the seventies to the first three 
years at the beginning of the eighties expenditure on imports as a ratio of GDP has 
increased from 10.1 per cent to 14.7 per cent. Some of this increase was associated 
with the boom in mineral investment in the 1978-1982 period but the increase seems to 
have been a general response to changing relative cost conditions. Over the last few 
years, for example, when investment has not been at unusually high levels, the volume 
of imports has remained high. 
It is particulary interesting that so much of the rapid growth of imports has occurred in 
the product categories where there are no tariffs. We refer to these imports as non 
competitive because it is assumed that if close substitutes were made locally the imports 
would be subject to a tariff. The rapid growth of these imports has two important 
implications. First, it is indicative of the degree to which Australia has avoided tariff 
increases. It is likely that during the fifties and sixties as these imports developed a 
market some local producer would seek a tariff and begin local production. This 
outcome, however, has not been common over the last decade. Second, it explains in 
part why Australian imports and manufacturing production do not respond quickly and 
significantly to exchange rate devaluations. Recent experience suggests that the degree 
of substitution between two thirds of Australian imports and domestic manufacture is 
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very low. Thus in the three months to March 1986 over the same period of 1985, and in 
the face of an exchange rate devaluation of about 26 percent, the value of capital and 
intermediate goods imports increased by 29 and 25 percent respectively. These items, 
approximately two thirds of imports, are non competitive. Consumption goods, which 
are mainly competitive imports increased by about 15 percent. 
The Current Economic Environment 
To understand the current economic environment in Australia it is necessary to go back 
at least to the beginning of the 1970s. Along with most of the world, the Australian 
economy boomed during the 1972 to 1974 period. This was also a period of rapid 
acceleration in the rate of inflation. Also, along with the rest of the world, we entered a 
slump in 1975 which led to increased unemployment, an increase in the real wage and 
a significant rise in government expenditure and the government deficit. Perhaps in 
response to these disturbances Australia entered a decade of slow growth during which 
the large changes in the structure of the economy that flowed from the mid seventies,-
the increased levels of unemployment, real wages and government expenditure -,were 
very slow to adjust. It appeared for a while, during the period 1980 to 1982, that 
perhaps the trend towards low growth might be broken but after an outbreak of wage 
inflation, the Australian economy entered the worst recession since the 1930s. The 
exceptional depth of this recession came about by a conjunction of circumstances; the 
downturn in the world economy, the effects of a drought and the natural and foreseen 
cessation of the exceptional high levels of investment in mineral development. 
Just after the election of the Labour Government in Dec.1982 the economy began to 
grow again quite quickly; partly in response to a turnaround in the factors that caused 
the slump such as the drought and the slow down in the world economy and also in 
response to the large increase in government expenditure brought about by the last 
budget of the Liberal party. Over the last three years employment growth has been 
exceptionally high although the inroads into the government deficit and the number of 
unemployed has been quite modest. 
Currently the economy is slowing down primarily in response to a general tightening in 
the stance of government policy which has seen as its main manifestation considerable 
increases in interest rates. The last three years has seen the emergence of new policy 
problems that are of interest to the agricultural sector. A few years ago it was widely 
believed that fast economic growth would encounter a contraint arising from our wage 
fixing system. This was the lesson of the 1980-82 period. This does not seemed to have 
happened in the most recent recovery. The Accord between the Labour Government and 
the Unions, following upon the worst recession in the labour market since before World 
War II, seems to have effectively controlled wage increases. Instead of beginning in 
the labour market the effective constraint has become evident in the balance of 
payments. 
It is a characteristic of the Australian economy that whenever the economy grows quickly 
imports grow even quicker (Figure 2). In this instance imports began their surge from 
an unusually high base. It was probably in recognition of this phenomenon, and 
memories of the rapid wage growth during the previous economic upturn, that led to the 
substantial devaluation of February 1985. This very large devaluation was expected to 
lead to a substantial switching of expenditure in Australia away from imports and 
towards domestic production. Indeed, at the time of last Budget, the Treasury forecast 
that over the year 1985/86 one third of the economic growth of production would come 
from the external account, increased exports and reduced imports in response to the 
devaluation. 
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After the event, the exchange rate devaluations have been greater than anticipated, 
especially with respect to the TWI but the switching was very slow and yet the economy 
did not seem to falter. Then, in response to fears as to a further deterioration in the 
balance of payments and strain on the Accord, monetary policy was tightened in 
November 1985 as we all waited for the J curve to arrive, that is for the balance of 
payments to improve after the initial worsening in response to the devaluation. 
However, the current account of the balance of payments has deteriorated further. The 
volume of Australian exports has grown quite considerably over the last year but during 
the last nine months of so there has been a considerable collapse in the Australian terms 
of trade. This decline has been substantial both in terms of its impact on the current 
account and on the real value of national income. The Statistician has estimated that the 
deterioration in the terms of trade has reduced the level of national income this year by 
three percent below what it otherwise would have been. 
As might be expected Australia's terms of trade fluctuate considerably and in historical 
terms the current reduction is not really exceptional in the extent of the decline. (Figure 
3). The major difficulties arise because the fall begins from such a low base and the 
timing is so bad for economic policy. Table 2 is taken from the Bulletin of the Reserve 
Bank of Australia, April, 1986. It allocates the changes in the balance of trade to four 
factors; a volume effect, an average price effect, a terms of trade effect and a residual. It 
is apparent from the table that the effects of the terms of trade have been paramount. 
Over 1985 the balance of trade was in deficit by about 1 billion. The change in the 
terms of trade contributed about one and a half billion to the deterioration thus offsetting 
the considerable rise in the volume of exports relative to imports that occurred over the 
year. Without the change in the terms of trade the balance of trade in goods and services 
would have improved in 1985. Since Dec.1985 the terms of trade have fallen a further 
five per cent. 
4. AGRICULTURE AND CUR..llliNT POLICY ISSUES 
The Exchange Rate 
The Australian exchange rate has become very volatile over the last year or so and it now 
seems to dominate the economic news. The exchange rate was floated 1 Dec 1983 but 
for macro economic purposes it could be regarded as floating well before that date. 
Before Dec 1983 the rate was set directly on a daily basis but it is quite clear from Figure 
3 that there is no natural break in exchange rate behaviour between the earlier period and 
the period during which the rate floated freely. Before floating the exchange rate there 
were a number of decisions, as part of our widespread financial deregulation, which 
increased the mobility of international capital to and from Australia which may have been 
as important as the move to the fully floating rate. 
Relative to the Bretton Woods system the new regime obviously exerts a quicker and 
larger influence upon the prices farmers receive as measured in domestic currency. 
When agricultural prices increase the exchange rate in Australia tends to also increase. In 
this way the exchange rate variations moderate short run adjustments in the sector. The 
exchange rate acts as an income smoothing mechanism. The degree to which the 
exchange rate changes can modify price flucuations in domestic currency is quite 
considerable as can be seen in a comparison of the farmers' terms of trade (the ratio of 
prices received to prices paid) and the nominal and real exchange rates. 
Although agricultural products have diminished in importance as a share of exports it is 
unlikely, from the viewpoint of the rural sector, that this smoothing mechanism has 
weakened because, as a guess, it is probable that mineral and agricultural prices will 
55 
Table 2: 
Contributions to Changes in the Balance of Trade in Goods and Services 
Volume effect 
Average price effect 
Terms of trade effect 
Residual 
Change in balance on 
goods and services 
($A million) 
1984 
I 
-687 
16 
-132 
15 
-788 
1985 
II I II 
-531 1503 -453 
-113 -146 -198 
-179 -552 -1086 
35 -102 60 
-788 703 -1677 
~ 
If) 
" 
150 
140 
130 
120 
110 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
69 Q'5 
" 
120 
110 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
Mar. 1970 
72Q'5 
FIGURE 3: 
Terms of Trade and 
tho EKchanQa ~t.e 
Nominal Effective 
Exchanoe Rete 
8103 6403 
Source,: Terms of Trade - QJarterly Estimates of Net'l Inc. ~ El<p .• March 1986. ABS 5206.0. 
Mer. 1973 
Nomlllli Exchange Rete - Moroan Guaranty 
Real Ef1ectlvt 
Exchange Rete 
Mar. 1976 Mar. 1979 
QJarter 
Mer. 1982 
Source: Moroan Guaranty 
57 
Mar. 1985 
generally continue to move together. Hence the diversification of Australian exports that 
has increased over the last few decades has, on the one hand, not really reduced our 
susceptibility to economic flucuations in world primary product prices and, on the other, 
not weakened the income smoothing effect discussed earlier. Of course, under the 
Bretton Woods system, more of the adjustment to a downward movement in rural export 
prices was to take place in the domestic price level rather than in the exchange rate. In 
the post World War period this strategy has been difficult to follow as domestic prices 
have been rarely flexible in a downward direction. Exchange rate variablility therefore 
gives much more flexibility to the system and would seem therefore to be an advantage 
to a farm sector that placed a positive value on income smoothing. 
As the current account has deteriorated economic policy makers and commentators have 
become more aware of the links between foreign capital inflows and interest rates. In 
Australia, as pressure seem to have increased on the exchange rate, interest rates have 
recently risen relative to the rest of the world and to record levels. (Figure 4) The very 
high interest rates, however, have been associated with fast growth of money and credit 
aggregates and generated a debate in the rural sector and elsewhere as to the appropriate 
mix of macro economic policies. 
The Macro Policy Mix 
It is fairly widely believed in Australia at the moment that the mix of macro policies is 
unbalanced and that too much emphasis is being placed on monetary policy. Monetary 
policy is seen as generating higher interest rates and thereby supporting the currency. 
The government seems anxious to be able to reduce interest rates as soon as possible but 
does not seem to be anxious to see a fall in the exchange rate. The recent significant 
reductions in the exchange rate are seen to be contributing to the inflation problem and 
the government has worked quite hard to achieve an agreement with the unions whereby 
they would accept wage discounting for the exchange rate effects on the price level. It is 
thought that any further large falls in the exchange rate will place too great a strain on the 
Accord. 
In response to the deterioration of the terms of trade and the worsening of the current 
account the government has begun to shift the burden of policy away from monetary 
policy and towards the reducing the demand of the government sector on resources and 
towards moderating wage increases. To illustrate how these arguments are now of 
interest to the rural sector we can look at the way these changes were anticipated in a 
speech of the Director of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics delivered to the National 
Agricultural Outlook Conference in January 1986. Dr. Stoekel argues as follows: 
further reductions in the rate of interest and the real exchange rate are necessary to 
achieve the increased exports that are needed. 
· monetary policy should not be relaxed. Relaxing monetary policy may in the medium 
term actually increase interest rates and although a relaxation may cause the exchange 
rate to fall, the result may be additional inflation so that the real exchange rate may not 
improve. 
· therefore the government deficit and the public sector borrowing requirements should 
be reduced. This will reduce the level of foreign capital inflow. 
· a reduced foreign capital inflow will cause the exchange rate to devalue. 
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<Herseas rates are for France, the U.K., Germany, and the USA. 
Source: Australian Economic Statistics 1949-50 to 1984-85: I Tables, Occssional Paper No. 8A, Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Long Term Interest Rates 
· to avoid increases in inflation wages should be discounted further. 
It may be of general interest to discuss some of these points as they relate to liberalization 
of the exchange rate setting mechanism and the agricultural sector. First, the agricultural 
sector is well aware that it would be better off with sustainable lower levels of interest 
rates and the exchange rate. The Director of the BAE estimates that a one percentage 
point reduction in the rate of interest would reduce interest payments by the farm sector 
on institutional debt by around 70 to 80 million a year, that is by about 2 to 3 per cent of 
the net returns of farmers. Over the last year interest payments have risen by an average 
of $2650 per farm. Similarly, the BAE estimates that a one per cent reduction of the real 
exchange rate would add between 50 and 100 million to the net value of farm 
production. 
Second, whether monetary policy should be relaxed or not to achieve these objectives is 
more debatable. With expectations playing such a large role in exchange rate and interest 
rate determination nowadays it seems to be possible to argue any relationship between 
the rate of interest and monetary policy. Indeed the Director of the BAE seems to be 
doing just that by arguing that tight monetary policy has increased interest rates but that 
loose monetary policy will not reduce them. Of course these positions can be reconciled 
by varying the time period to which the statements apply and whether the nominal or real 
rate is being considered. It is not clear, however, to what degree interest rates are 
determined in Australia by monetary policy and the public sector borrowing requirements 
and to what degree overseas developments are important. Both sets of factors obviously 
contribute but for many policy purposes we need to have an idea of the relative strength 
of these two sets of influences. Figures 4 and 5 plot Australian real and nominal interest 
rates against overseas interest rates. A number of associations seem clear. 
Generally speaking, the association between Australian and overseas nominal interest 
rates is very close. The high nominal interest rates that prevail here today would seem 
to have been part of a general trend towards higher nominal interest rates around the 
world. It is also noticeable, that there is a close association of real rates. This is a 
reflection of the similarity of Australian and world inflation rates. It would seem, 
therefore, that the extent to which inflation is under our control is very much the same 
extent to which nominal rates are under our control. 
Third, would a tighter fiscal policy help the farm sector? At the moment economic 
activity is slowing quickly in Australia and in the absence of any other policy change a 
tighter fiscal stance will contribute to that downturn. The private sector does not 
instantly rush in to fill any expenditure gaps that are left by the public sector. 
Furthermore, in the short run, reduced economic activity and higher unemployment may 
not reduce the budget deficit to any degree. In fact over the last decade each downturn in 
economic activity has been associated with an increase in the budget deficit as decreases 
in economic activity leads to reduced tax revenue and increased expenditure on welfare 
payments. The lower activity, however, generated by the tighter fiscal policy should 
ease the pressure on the balance of payments and enable interest rates to be less 
supportive of the dollar. Under this outcome the farm sector is likely to lose as much by 
a stronger dollar as it is to gain by a lower interest rate. The proposition that cutting the 
government deficit will in the near future result in a lower real exchange rate must be 
very doubtful, indeed I would argue the reverse. In any event, I don't want to pretend to 
be certain about the actual short run links between these economic variables but rather to 
illustrate how the range of tools of economic analysis needed by agricultural economists 
is changing. To be a micro agricultural economist would not seem to be enough today. 
As is indicated by the address of the Director of the BAE agricultural economists here 
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have begun to discuss macro policy questions, but to date there is very little published 
analysis in Australia. It is interesting, in this context, to look at some more recent 
developments among US agricultural economists. J Chalfant et. al. (1985) presented a 
paper at the recent Australian Agricultural Economist Conference where they argued that 
loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policy was clearly a policy mix that was not in the 
interests of the rural sector in the US. In their view this policy mix led to overshooting 
of the exchange rate. The large appreciation of the US dollar quite clearly led to the rural 
sector being subject to greater foreign competition. Their model generates short run 
effects of monetary policy which change relative prices to benefit the agricultural sector 
when monetary policy is expansionary and turns against the sector when monetary 
policy is tight. The principal source of the conclusion is that farm prices respond quickly 
to exchange rate changes, monetary policy can affect exchange rates quickly, but prices 
elsewhere in the economy are slow to respond. Consequently, an appreciated exchange 
rate in the short run reduces farm prices received much more that it leads to lower prices 
paid by farmers. There is obviously an interesting field of research here for agricultural 
economists. 
Finally, the Director of the BAE has called for a greater degree of liberalization in the 
labour market. Even to be a good macro economist is not even enough but a good 
agricultural economist must also understand labour markets as well. The call for greater 
flexibility would seem to come from two sources. First, there is a perceived need to 
allow farmers' costs to have some downward flexibility during difficult times for the 
farm sector. In the recent past, for example, National Wage Increases have been delayed 
before being passed on to the farm sector. Second, the call for more flexible labour 
markets can be related to the earlier point about the flexibility of farm product prices 
relative to input prices. It is thought that more flexibility in the domestic non farm price 
level will reduce the variability in the real exchange rate. 
One of the successes of the Labour government to date has been the Prices and Income 
Accord. This agreement with the unions has delivered a much greater degree of wage 
moderation than was thought possible a few years ago. Currently, however, because of 
the devaluations and full wage indexation the rate of inflation has been slow to reduce in 
Australia. As a result the government has argued that money wage increases should be 
discounted for the effects of the devaluation and in this way slow down the inflation 
emanating from that source. Since the terms of trade have deteriorated and the current 
account has not improved the pressure for further adjustments to wages policy has 
increased. The current proposals are to postpone the next wage round so that there is 
only one wage decision this year, slow up the rate of introduction of private 
superannuation schemes for workers, and to seek further discounting in the next wage 
round in response to the terms of trade loss. Whether the unions will accept such an 
outcome is yet to be seen. Of course, as in all policy debates the real problem is the 
counterfactual case. It is not clear, for example, that the attempt to get more flexibility in 
labour markets and wage moderation in a country where unions have very large 
coverage and are powerful may not lead to the opposite outcome. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I began discussing the old issues of liberalization and then gradually drifted off into 
discussing some current macro policy issues. As I did so it became increasingly clear to 
me that the dominant theme of the address is a very exciting one for young agricultural 
economists but just another sign of bad times for us older guys who are finding it hard to 
learn new tricks. The exciting theme, of course, is the opening up of the agricultural 
economics profession that will occur over the next few years. To be a profession 
consisting only of good micro economists will not be appropriate in the new world. 
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Main stream macro concems--the appropriate macro policy mix, the effects of monetary 
policy on interest rates and exchange rates, the determinants of real exchange rates--will 
increasingly become topics of research and interest to farmers. 
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ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE: 
THE CASE OF CHILE 
Cristian Zegers Prado 
Development Manager 
Chilean Production Development Corporation 
INTRODUCTION 
The process of liberalising the Chilean economy was initiated in 
1974 after four decades of growing government intervention. At the 
time when the authorities adopted this decision and implemented the 
first measures to transform economic activity, the country was in a 
very difficult situation with a large number of enterprises intervened 
in or administered by the Government, a significant area of the 
country·s agricultural land (about 40 percent of the productive 
equivalent land) had been expropriated or taken over by the Land 
Reform programmes of the two previous administrations, and on top of 
that, Chile had the highest inflation rate in the world. In this 
difficult environment the present government decided to give back to 
the private sector its decision making role in production, to open the 
economy to foreign markets and to control inflation. This started 
with the application of several macro-economic and sector-specific 
measures within an overall policy framework, but in practice many of 
them had unexpected effects. This was largely due to the dynamics of 
the Chilean economy, which on several occasions did not adjust at the 
desi red speed, or the adjustments requested were not small, but of a 
large magnitude, and the economic agents reactions were not those 
anticipated by policy makers. Fortunately, the economy is now moving 
in the right direction, and the agricultural sector is making a large 
contribution towards the goals of self sufficiency and generation of 
foreign exchange. These last results, in the case of agriculture, 
have been achieved within a scheme that provides a certain degree of 
protection to key crops for internal consumptions, while keeping open 
the rest of the agricultural markets. 
OVERVIEW OF MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 
During the last 12 years Chile has applied an economic liberalisation 
policy in order to achieve growth, employment and price stability. 
This policy introduced changes in an effort to increase efficiency in 
resource allocation and to benefit from the economic gains stemming 
from international trade and large markets. The main characteristics 
of this programme have been the elimination of price controls, the 
freeing of the capital markets, the liberalisation of trade, the 
control of inflation, the assurance of private property rights and a 
reduction of government intervention in the economy. 
From the outset of this period, the macro-economic programme addressed 
the elimination of the fiscal deficit and a devaluation of the 
exchange rate. There was a major devaluation of approximately 300 
percent in Septe'nber 1973 (Tables 1 and 2). At the same time, several 
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TABLE CHILE. 
INFLATION AND NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE OF THE US DOLLAR 
CAnnual Averages) 
YEA R Inflation Pesos per YEA R Inflation Pesos per 
rate Dollar rate Dollar 
1973 508. 1 0,11 1980 31,2 39,00 
1974 375,9 0,83 1981 9,5 39,00 
1975 340,7 4,91 1982 20,7 50,91 
1976 174,3 13,05 1983 23, 1 78,79 
1977 63,5 21,54 1984 23,0 98,48 
1978 30,3 31,67 1985 26,4 160,86 
1979 38,9 37,25 
--
SOURCES: Banco Central de Chile. Indicodores Econ6micos y Sociales 1960-1982. 
Bolet!n Mensual Abril 1986. Banco Central de Chile. 
measures were taken to uni fy the exchange rate duri ng 1975, and 
eliminate the multiple system appliecl by the previous Administration. 
~xchange rate management was necessary due to internal inflation and 
balance of payments objectives, determining the application of a 
crawling peg system until mid 1976, when a 10 percent revaluation of 
the peso occurred and the authorities shifted to a system of 
pre-announced mini-devaluations. During this period the government 
reduced import tariffs and eliminated quotas. 
This realistic exchange rate policy can be regarded today as one of 
the principal elements in the successful growth rates attained by the 
Chilean economy between 1975 and 1979, which were based on the 
expansion and diversification of its exports and the substitution of 
imports. 
The progress in the export sector was very important for the country, 
because 82 percent of foreign exchange earnings in 1973 came 
from a single product: copper. The liberalisation policy meant a 
challenge to the private sector that was successfully faced and a fast 
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TABLE 2 CHILE. 
FISCAL INCOME, EXPENDITURE AND OVERALL SURPLUS OR DEFICIT 
(in percentage of GOP) 
YEA R Fiscal Fiscal Overall Surplus 
Income Expendtturo or Deficit (-) . 
1973 20.2 44.9 - 24.7 
1974 21.9 32.4 - 10.5 
1975 24.8 27.4 - 2.6 
1976 23.5 25.0 - 2.3 
1977 23.1 24.9 - 1.8 
1978 23.0 23.8 - 0.8 
1979 24.5 22.8 1.7 
1980 26.2 23.1 3. 1 
1981 26.6 24.9 1.7 
1982 26.2 28.5 - 2.3 
1983 24.6 28.4 
-
3.8 
1984* 24.8 28.8 - 4.0 
·PROVISIONAL FIGURES 
SOURCE: Banco Central de Chile. Boletln Mensual Marzo 1986. 
Takem from Ministry of Finance. National Budget Office. 
response came in the form of increased exports of fruits, fishmeal and 
forestry products, such that copper reduced its share to 47 percent of 
Chilean exports in 1979 (Table 3). 
The period between 1975 and 1979 is also characterised by a more 
efficient allocation of resources and increments in productivity. 
Nevertheless these changes had negative effects on the manufacturing 
sector, which decreased its share in the overall economy in reaction 
to foreign competition in subsectors like textiles, chemical products 
and several industrial goods. On the other hand, the positive side is 
found in the expansion of sectors with export potential which 
increased their absolute and relative contribution to gross domestic 
product (GOP). The liberalisation of the economy has been the major 
force behind the structural adjustments observed, with the farm sector 
moving away from internal consumption crops (like cereals, sugarbeets, 
oilseeds) towards products demanded in international markets (fruits, 
pulses, vegetables), with the forestry sector and related industries 
expanding their exports (logs, sawn woods, pulp and paper products) 
and a similar expansion in non-ferrous minerals and fishmeal exports. 
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I T E M 
Total Exports 
Mining Products 
- Copper 
Agricultural and 
Fishing Products 
- Agricultural 
- Animal 
- Forest 
- Fishes & Seafood 
Manufacturing 
Products 
Foods (-Fishmeall 
Fishmeal 
.. Woods 
Pulp & Paper 
Others 
*Pravisional figures 
Average 
1960-19701 1973 1974 1975 
TABLE 3 Cf-lILE. EXPORT OF GOODS 
(Millions of US dollars) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984* 
:::~!i!iiii!illjl'll:j:l~!~:::i' i~m~::i:j:iii jffi~:~~~~jljj i~~j:::m:ll~;~:~~~i:jj~i:'~~~i:':iijj j~j:j~:~i::: I'~m~~:;'! ~l'l~:~. :jjjj l~i::::~j;i:jjjj j~::i:~~i:'; ~i:::~~i:i: 
:::2$:]:$::::::::::::: ::H::::Z$:;:$.::::I::::::::::SS:i:o.::::I::::::::::SlEJ::::I:::::Hi:Je.:i:i?:::::IH:::J5.9::;:S::::I:::::::20r5.:;:;;;::::1:::::::26.4.:;:$':::1:::::::0.0.9::;:9:::::1:::::::0.6.$.:;:4::::1:::::::3.14.:;:9:::::1:::::::0.21:;:;;;::::1:::::::4.2$.:;:0.::: 
16.0 20.8 
8.2 1.2 
0.7 1.9 
0.9 1.6 
42.9 
4.4 
3.2 
4.5 
59.7 
16.7 
3.7 
6.0 
86.2 
24.8 
1.0 
6.9 
126.6 
23.2 
1.2 
8.5 
157.7 
27.8 
2.4 
15.6 
183.8 
37.5 
3.3 
39.9 
244.3 
36.9 
1.6 
57.1 
268.0 
29. 1 
2.1 
66.2 
278.1 
33.5 
2.2 
61.1 
253.7 
26.4 
2.3 
45. 1 
345.7 
28.9 
1.8 $ 
51.9 
H!:j~G:o.HH::::: ::HHa9::i:W:: :HH29:likl$.:::: HH~9:W~l$.H :H::$~o.>E:: m::::!$.~t;:i$.:::: :::::::1e.2:;:o.H Ti:¥.H$.:i'9:H :Vi:1$.';L:e.H J>2.9::tU~H: JH]H2.Qi.L'}H :YiJ6.7::U::::: HtH~6.o.:UF 
)214 9.3 18.0 72.6 48.4 82.6 80.2 120.2 141.9 124.0 109.8 116.8 131.1 
) . 12.0 31.1 29.2 61.6 86.5 105.8 152.6 233.7 202.0 256.0 307.1 275.7 
3.8 4.1 12.7 25.2 29.4 70.4 94.4 164.7 286.2 121.0 122.3 116.4 116.3 
16.0 33.1 115.0 93.7 135.9 134.4 159.1 238.8 297.2 254.3 219.6 208.0 259.3 
37.8 30.9 113.8 169.9 244.8 253.7 342.5 739.6 800.8 592.3 499.4 418.8 477.9 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Chile. Indicadares Economicos y Sociales 1960-1982. 
Banco Central de Chile. Boletin Mensual Abril 1986. 
YEA R Gross .Domestic Export 
Product 
Average 
1960-1970 186.661 27.969 
1973 287.750 28.548 
1974 290.554 41.666 
1975 253.043 42.644 
1976 261 .945 53.037 
1977 287.769 59.338 
1978 311.417 65.978 
1979 337.207 75.310 
1980 363.446 86.077 
1981 383.551 78.373 
1982* 329.523 82.069 
1983* 327.180 82.583 
1984* 347.926 88. 190 
1985* 356.447 94.257 
-- ---- -
TABlE·.4 GillE. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND TRADE 
(Million of 1977 pesos) 
Import Trade Terms of Trade 
Balance Effect 
50.679 - 22.710 21.065 
72.005 - 43.457 35.499 
74.429 - 32.763 34. 140 
45.647 
-
3.003 281 
47.608 5.429 3.710 
64.523 
-
5.185 -
75.851 
-
9.873 - 753 
93.040 - 17.730 7.639 
110.461 - 24.384 7.361 
127.182 - 48.809 59 
81.378 691 - 8. 105 
69.072 13.511 - 4.166 
80.471 7.719 n.o. 
71.623 22.634 n.o. 
• Provisional figures. n.a. not available. 
SOURCE: Banco Central de Chile. Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 1960-1983. 
Banco Central de Chile. Boletin Mensual Abril 1986. 
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Export as Import as 
% of GDP % of GDP 
15.0 27. 1 
9.9 25.0 
14.3 25.6 
16.9 18.0 
20.2 18.2 
20.6 22.4 
21.2 24.4 
22.3 27.6 
23.7 30.4 
20.4 33.2 
24.9 24.7 
25.2 21.1 
25.3 23. 1 
26.4 20.1 
--- -- - ----_ .. - --- -- ----- --
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The export drive between 1973 and 1979 is reflected in the large 
proportion of exports in the total economic product. Exports 
increased from 9.9 to 22.3 percent of GDP, while imports decreased 
from 25 to 18.2 percent between 1973 and 1976 and expanded again to 
27.6 percent by 1979 (Table 4). As a result of these :novements, the 
trade balance was positive only in 1976. 
The 1973-76 period is also characterised by GDP growth rates 
oscillating from positive to negative, and with disinvestment in fixed 
capital in 3 out of 4 years. This behaviour changed afterwards and 
the economy grew at an average rate of 7.7 percent per year between 
1976 and 1981, along vlith investlnent in fhed capital growing at an 
annual rate of 17.7 percent (Table 5). 
TABLE 5 CHILE. 
FIXED CAPITAL INVESTIMENT, EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GROWTH RATES. 
(in percentages) 
YEA R Fixed Export Import GOP 
Capital 
Investment 
Average 
1960-1970 4.3 3.6 6.6 4.3 
1973 
-
6.0 2.8 - 5.4 - 5.6 
1974 19. 1 45.9 3.4 1.0 
1975 
-
22.8 2.4 - 38.7 
-
12.9 
1976 
-
14,8 24.4 4.3 3.5 
1977 15.4 11.9 35.5 9.9 
1978 17.4 11.2 17.6 8.2 
1979 16.8 14.1 22.7 8.3 
1980 21.9 14.3 18.7 7.8 
1981 16.8 
-
9.0 15.7 5.5 
1982* 
- 33.9 4.7 - 36.3 - 14. 1 
1983* 
- 14.9 0.6 - 15.1 - 0.7 
1984* 9.0 6.8 16.5 6.3 
1985* 14.8 6.9 - 11.0 2.4 
* Provisional figures. 
I 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Chile Indicadores Econ6micos y Socioles 1960-1982. 
Banco Central de Chile Boletln Mensual Abril 1986. 
70 
In spite of the rather low magnitude of investment, it was large 
enough to support the effort of many Chilean producers who decided to 
compete in the international markets, but the situation in the home 
market for others became tougher with imports expandi ng between 1977 
and 1980 at a faster rate than exports (Table 5). 
The low investment levels are partially explained by the reduction of 
public investment with the goal of eliminating the fiscal deficit, 
which was achieved only in 1979, 1980 and 1981. Another 
characteristic of investment in this period is that important amounts 
were allocated to inventories and construction (mainly houses), with 
these two items totalling 65.5 percent of the gross capital formation 
in 1981 (Table 6). 
Nevertheless, the performance of the Chilean economy prior to 1979 can 
be regarded as successful, and this can be associated with the 
exchange rate policy. However in mid 1979 the peso-dollar parity was 
fixed at a rate of CH$39 per US dollar, with two major objectives in 
TABLE 6 CHILE. 
CAPITAL FORMATION 
(in percentage of GDP) 
YEA R Gross Capital Gross Fixed Change in 
Formation Capital Formation Stocks 
1973 14.3 14.7 - 0.4 
1974 25.8 17.4 8.4 
1975 14.0 15.4 - 1.4 
1976 13.6 12 ;7 0.9 
1977 14.4 13.3 1.1 
1978 16.5 14.5 2.0 
1979 19.6 15.6 4.0 
1980 23.9 17.6 6.3 
1981 27.6 19.5 8. 1 
1982 11. 1 15.0 - 3.9 
1983 9.3 12.9 - 3.6 
1984 15.3 13.2 2. 1 
1985 13.9 14.7 - 0.8 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Chile. Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 
1960-1983. 
Bonco Central de Chile. Boletin Mensual Abril 1986. 
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mind: to reduce inflation and to lower interest rates (Table 1). 
This fixed exchange rate lasted until 14 June of 1982, when the peso 
was devaluated by 18 percent. The decision to peg the dollar price, 
together with the opening of the capital account, proved to be 
extremely negative to the economy. These two measures caused 
tremendous disequilibria that ended in a large depression with exports 
decreasing 9.0 percent in 1981 and GOP falling by 14.1 percent in 1982 
(Table 5). 
An unexpected result was that the purchasing power of important 
segments of the population increased with inflation due to the 
pre-established system of wage indexation. Thus 0 fixed exchange rate 
made imports cheaper and affected negatively the activity of import 
substituting industries. 
[)uring these years construction and commerce were the most favoured 
activities of this artificial boom, greatly assisted by large capital 
inflows. Consequently, the foreign debt of Chile expanded at a speed 
that became very difficult to pay. As an example, in 1981 capital 
entered the country in an amount equivalent to 47.7 percent of GDP 
(US$4.7 billion). 
The positive sides of this policy were the decrease in the inflation 
rate and the growth of credit and financial activities. But the 
overall effect was negative throwing the country in a depression 
characterised by: 
- negative growth rates 
- negative capital formation 
increments in the unemployment level (it reached 23.8% in 1982) 
- increased debt levels 
- insolvency of many firms 
- liquidity problems in several banks 
The general picture forced a decision from the government, such that 
in June 1982 the fixed exchange rate was changed and in September the 
peso was floated along with restricting access to other currencies 
after an important loss in foreign reserves. These adjustments 
produced in a short time: a trade surplus (mainly due to the fall in 
imports, which in 1983 diminished to 54 percent of the 1981 level), an 
inflation rate of 23.1 percent, unemployment decreased to 14.6 percent 
of the 1 abou r force and GOP fell by 0.7 percent. 
Nowever, during this period Chile was able to expand its exports as 
shown by the corresponding quantity index (+13.5% between 1980 and 
1983), unfortunately prices received by exports declined by 
27.9 percent. This movement is reflected in the terms of trade index, 
which in the last 3 years has remained around 83 percent of the level 
observed in 1980 (Table 7). The government faced with a loss in the 
purchasing power of the country's exports and the restricted access to 
external funds, established in 1985 a strict structural adjustment 
programme based on: 
(a) The expansion of export and import substitution sectors. 
(b) Incentives to domestic savings and investments and 
(c) The renegotiation of the external debt. 
The first results of this new policy have accomplished the predefined 
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TABLE 7 CHILE 
PRICE AND QUANTUM INDEXES OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
I T EM 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Total Exeort 
Price Index 100,0 87,2 75,5 72,1 69,2 
Quantum Index 100,0 95,2 109,3 113,5 122,7 
Agric. & Fishin~ Exeorts 
Price Index 100,0 104,7 102,0 84,8 98,0 
Quontum Index 100,0 108,6 128,7 139, 1 166,5 
Total Imeort 
Price Index 100,0 104, 1 97,2 83,7 83,4 
Quantum Index 100,0 133, 1 92,5 68,6 82,9 
Terms of Trade 100,0 83,8 77 ,6 86, 1 83,0 
% Annual Variation - - 16,2 - 7,4 10,9 - 3,6 
SOURCE: Banco Centrol de Chile. Boletin Mensual Abril 1986. 
goals and Chile's economy is growing again (2.4 percent in 1985, and 
the estimates of 1986 place this rate between 3 and 5 percent). 
Unemployment is decreasing and it is close to 11 percent, interest 
rates are fal ling (borrowing rate about 8 percent in 1986 instead of 
16.9 percent in 1982), and the trade balance is positive (US$l billion 
in 1985 and US$616 million for the January-May period of 1986). 
Having this background information let us review the behaviour of some 
of the most important variables of the agricultural sector, such as 
land use, economic returns, the price situation and trade. 
LAND USE 
The area planted with crops remained at a level close to 1.2 million 
hectares during the second half of the seventies, but it diminished 
rapidly between 1981 and 1983 to 871 thousand hectares reflecting the 
impact of macro-economic decisions. This sharp decline in the area 
planted is largely explained by wheat (Table 8). The situation 
changed in 1984 and 1985 when the area devoted to wheat reached 471 
73 
1985 r;:. 
63,5 
127,7 
88,7 
201,1 
84,2 
73, 1 
75,4 
- 9, 1 
~ 
TABLES GillE. 
AREA PLANTED WITH CROPS AND FRUITS 
YEA R Wheat Other Row 
Cereals Crops 
1974 591,0 307,0 214,9 
1975 686,2 283,9 176,5 
1976 697,6 271,6 188, 1 
1977 628,0 300,6 238,1 
1978 579,5 276,4 262,5 
1979 560,5 323,4 274,8 
1980 545,7 306,3 291,3 
1981 432,2 291,8 289,0 
1982 
-
373,8 275,4 260,0 
1983 359,2 276,4 194,2 
1984 471 ,3 311,2 211, 1 
1985 506,2 293,8 200, 1 
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadlsticas 
CORFO Catastros Frutlcolcs 
(thousandhectcres) 
Oilseeds Sugarbeets 
33,5 26,3 
58,8 40,7 
81,1 60,9 
64,0 54,8 
55,3 21,4 
75,6 16,3 
82,8 11 , 1 
29,0 36,8 
13,7 22,0 
5,6 35,6 
9 I 1 47,8 
39, 1 44,1 
-
-~- ,--
Universidad Cat61icc. Departamento de Economlc Agrario. 
Total 
Crops 
1.172,7 
1.246,1 
1 .299,3 
1.285,5 
1.195,1 
1.250,6 
1.237,2 
1.078,8 
944,9 
871,0 
1.050,5 
1 .083,3 
---------
Table Apples 
Grapes 
4,150 11 .290 
4,250 11.350 
5,650 11.700 
6,950 12.200 
8,405 12.970 
10,290 13.585 
12,550 14.735 
14,480 15.768 
15,958 16.652 
17,363 17.662 
18,824 17.897 
21,375 17.997 
----------
Total 
Fruits 
63.950 
63.885 
65.675 
67.640 
69.885 
73.202 
77.186 
82.310 
86. 113 
89.708 
93.034 
96.003 
----
----_ .. _--
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ann rj()6 th~u<;dnd hectares, respectiv~ly. Oil crops, declined steadily 
frt)lIl d rndXlillUnl area planted of (31 thousand hectares in 1916, to So6fJO 
hect~res in 19H3. At present, rapeseed and sunflower sowings show a 
partial recovery, approaching 40 thousand hectares, reflecting the 
effect of the price band decreed by the government, as in the case of 
wheat. 
Sugarbeets also expanded strongly after 1982 responding to the special 
incentives provided for this crop. Area planted with sugarbeets in 
1984 totalled 48 thousand hectares supplying most of the internal 
consumption of sugar. 
After 1983 farmers have responded to general and sectorial policies 
imple~ented in 1983 and 1984. The consequence has been the expansion 
of 200 thousand hectares in the area planted between 1983 and 1985, 
and that together with higher yields in most crops resulting from a 
strong technological transfer effort, has produced an important 
substitution effect on imports of foodstuffs and agricultural 
products. 
Fruit product i on is the subs ector that has benefited most from the 
opening of international markets. The area planted increased from 
65 thousand hectares in 1973 to 96 thousand hectares in 1985, but 
production has expanded at a faster pace than area. In 1975 output 
was close to 550 thousand tons and in 1985 it exceeded 1 million tons, 
with an increasing proportion of exports in total fruit production (it 
increased from 55 percent in 1975 to 78 percent in 1985). 
Fruits are produced basically for the export markets of Europe, North 
America, Latin America and the Middle East. The most important fruits 
are table grapes and apples, which generated 56 and 25 percent of the 
value of the fruit crop in value terms in 1984. 
Vegetables have occupied a rather stable area, of the order of 
100 thousand hectares, although in 1984-85 the area planted with these 
crops has heen estimated to be 118 thousand hectares. Export of 
asparagus, Illelons, garlic, onions and of other (fresh and frozen) 
vegetables is starting to grow, together with the construction of 
several processing and freezing plants. 
Wine production, which was largely protected by different regulations, 
is another product affected by the liberalisation policies. legal 
changes that eliminated restrictions on planting vineyards, and 
productivity changes introduced by farmers generated a supply 
expansion in the seventies with depressing effects on internal wine 
prices and building up of large stocks. The farmers I reaction was to 
pull up plants dnd to graft with table grapes varieties. This 
adjustment has resulted in a decrease in the area planted in vineyards 
from 113 thousand hectares in 1973 to 70 thousand hectares in 1985. 
~CONOMIC RETURNS IN AGRICULTURE 
f)isaggreg<'lt:~d inforlnation by economic sector from the national 
accounts is available only for the 1974-82 period. These data provide 
some insight on the distribution of the total agricultural product. 
In fact, the relative figures for 1974-77 show a gain in input 
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TABLE rj CHILE. 
RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PRODUCT 
(in percentage) 
YEA R Gross Value Inputs Value Hired Net Indi rect Depretiation 
Product Added Labor Taxes 
1974 100.0 50.5 49.5 14.6 1.4 10. 1 
1975 100.0 52.0 48.0 13.7 2.4 12. 1 
1976 100.0 42.4 57.6 12.8 5.0 9.9 
1977 100.0 32.8 67.2 13.5 4. 1 9.0 
1978 100.0 37.9 62.1 15.8 5.2 9. 1 
1979 100.0 38.0 62.0 14.6 4.8 9.0 
1980 100.0 38.4 61.6 14.9 6.3. 8.8 
1981 100.0 41.0 59.0 17 . 1 6.7 8.9 
1982 100.0 46.7 53.3 20. 1 6.9 10.2 
------
Note: Information not available for 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
SOURCE: Calculated from Banco Central de Chile. Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 1960-1983. 
Operating 
Surplus 
23.4 
19.7 
30.0 
40.5 
32.0 
33.6 
31.5 
26.4 
16.0 
L.O 
r---
productivity due to il better allocation of resources (input share 
diminished from 52 to 33 percent), suggesting that growth in the 
sector's GOP was based on a cost minimisation approach (Table 9). 
After 1971 input share recovered importance indicating that output 
expansion can be associated with the larger amounts of inputs used. 
Lahour shar'2, in turn, moved around a 14 percent level, with the 
exception of 1981 and 1982, when it jumped to 17 and 20 percent, 
respectively. This higher participation of labour in the total 
product should be linked with the wage indexation policy, which 
together with the fixed exchange rate negatively affected the economy. 
In the case of agriculture, the higher shares of inputs and labour, 
plus the increasing trend of indirect taxes, are the main reasons for 
the reduction in the operating surplus observed for this sector. This 
indicator decreased from 40.5 percent in 1977 to 16.0 percent in 1982. 
This loss in economic productivity is the main reason behind the 
changes in area planted with crops in those years. 
There is no published data available, after 1982, at a disaggregated 
level, but growth rates in agricultural GOP in 1984 (7.1 percent) and 
in 1985 (5.0 percent) suggest a recovery in the profitability of this 
sector. 
TABLE 10 CHILE. 
OPERATING SURPLUS OF THE ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY 
TOTAL ECONOMY AGRICULTURE & FORESTRY 
YEA R 
as % Total as % Total % Sector as % Sector as 
GDP Disposable Incare GDP Income 
1974 35.9 49.1 47.3 61.6 
1975 32.3 44.4 41.1 58.9 
1976 34.7 47.5 52.0 70.0 
1977 34.5 46.7 60.3 74.9 
1978 36.2 47.7 51.5 66.9 
1979 41.5 53.5 54.2 69.8 
1980 40.1 5l.2 51.2 67.8 
1981 35.8 46.9 44.7 60.7 
1982 34.2 45.2 30.0 44.3 
NOTE: Income figures not available for 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
SOURCE: Calculated from Banco Central. Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 1960-
1983. 
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AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD PRICE POLICIES 
Govern,nent intervention in marketing and pricing of foods and 
agricultural products has a long history in Chile. They started in 
the thirties with the application of several meaSJres to the so-called 
essential foods. Rut it is not necessary to go so far back to 
demonstrate the role of government in the agricultural sector. In 
1960 it was possible to find the following intervF~nUon measures: 
1. Nominal price fixation for: 
wheat, hread, beef, milk, rice, sugar and oi I seeds. 
2. Marketing mar~ins fixation for: 
Wheat, flour and milk. 
3. Export restrictions for: 
Wheat, flour and sheep meat. 
4. Oi fferent i ated tari ffs and pri or depos its for imports of: 
Wheat, beef cattle, dairy products, fertilisers, pesticides, 
farm mach i nery. 
5. Beef mal'keting restrictions: 
(Slaughter prohibition of heifers, restriction on the number of 
meat retai 1 outlets, beef sales rationing). 
6. Subsidies for: 
Fertilisers, railway fares and credit. 
These measures were mainly adopted with the purpose of providing low 
priced foods to the urban consumers and they were applied within an 
anti-inflationary framework. As a consequence of this price policy, 
agricultural income was low and there was little incentives for 
technical change and investment, in spite of the partial compensation 
stemming from interventions in the input markets. 
In the second half of the sixties the Frei Administration proposed an 
explicit price policy. Its main objectives were to raise fann income 
in order to finance investments ano sectorial growth, ~nd to change 
the price relationships within the sector based on the production 
advantages of the country. 
This policy resulted in a larger government intervention and price 
fixation than before, although an alignment with international prices 
was intended in order to lessen existing distortions. 
The Agricultural Development Plan proposed by that Administration 
defined wheat as the basic product with prices of other crops and 
products adjusting in relation to it, some of them increasing in real 
terms (i .e. oil seeds) and other decreasing (i.e. corn, pork). 
Nevertheless, the lack of growth in livestock production generated 
special reco~nendations for this subsector. which in terms of prices 
meant that beef should get the highest possible real price of all 
products with the milk price at the farm gate fixed in specific 
relation to that of beef. This active policy excluded the prices of 
some products with fruits and vegetables being the big exceptions. 
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The Allende Administration (Nov. 1970-Sept. 1973), instituted a system 
of price fixation based on production costs plus "adequate" profit 
mar~ins, toyether with an increasing presence of State owned marketing 
hoards that purchased production from farmers at official prices. 
This expansive trend of Government intervention was enlarged in early 
1973 in response to the appearance of black markets and chaos in the 
distribution system for foods as well as other goods. 
The present Administration, which took over the government in 
September 1973, proposed a completely different policy, market 
oriented, with the state assuming a subsidiary role, leaving to the 
private sector the responsibility of most production decisions. This 
policy instituted a proyressive liberalisation of prices (including 
those of agricultural products) along with a reduction in tariffs and 
adjustments in the exchange rate. 
In 1977, only three products - wheat, sugarbeets and oil seeds -
remained subject to intervention via the application of price bands, 
although they ~"ere not effective because prices Inoved within the 
established bounds dnd they were eliminated in 1979. Milk production 
also was protected through the application of import levies in order 
to counteract the European Economic Community export incentives for 
dai ry products. 
The opening of agriculture to foreign markets generated an increase in 
rea 1 pri ces whi ch prornoted a recovery in the sector I s output 
(Table 12). Nevertheless the overvalued peso and the high cost of 
credit, especially between 1980 and 1983 (the peak years of trade and 
price liberalisation in Chile), influenced negatively the production 
of most crops. This is reflected in: 
(a) A 29.~ percent decrease in the area planted wit~ crops between 
1979-80 and 1982-83. 
(b) An increase in food imports (up 58% between 1979 and 1981). 
(c) A decrease in the operating surplus of the sector that, 
according to national accounts, reached 30 percent of the 
agricultural gross domestic product in 1982. down from 54 percent 
achieved in 1979. 
(d) The ex~ansion of the sectorls debt which was estimated at US$1.7 
billion in 1983, a figure larger than that yearls agricultural 
GOP of US$998 million. 
In 1983, the yovernillent i'nph~rnented a programme to stimulate 
agricultural production consisting of the re-establishment of price 
hands for wheat and oil seeds and the announcement of support prices 
for sugarbeets together with a system of variable tariffs for imported 
wheat, oil seeds dnd sugar, and a 35 percent tariff on the FOB prices 
of dairy products in the European Economic Community. 
The openi ng 0 f the economy for lives tock and rni 11< producers l!lade 
necessary the application of irnport surcharges to the imports of dairy 
products, tlS explained previously, but it is necessary to mention that 
in 1981 the country was able to eradicate foot and rnouth disease. 
This success could allow Chile to become an exporter of beef to the US 
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YEA R Wheat 
US$/l 00 Kg. 
Average 
1960-1970 8,47 
1973 3,45 
1974 14,55 
1975 19. 15 
1976 17,70 
1977 15,50 
1978 14,58 
1979 14,55 
1980 13,37 
1981 12,41 
1982 11 , 91 
1983 16,17 
1984 17,06 
1985** 19,45 
* Average for 1969-70. 
TABLE 11 CHILE. 
DOMESTIC WHOLESALE PRICES FOR SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
(in 1985 US dollars) 
Corn Sugar Beet Rapessed Beef Cottle Fresh milk Wool 
US$/100 Kg. US$/ton. US$/lOO Kg. US$/Kg. US$/l t. US$/Kg. 
9,57 22,04* 14,62 0,47 0,08 1.03 
20,43 13,02 5.25 0.64 0.10 1,01 
14,19 18,77 14.08 0.94 O. 12 1,06 
13,02 33,15 24.31 0,35 0.10 0.69 
13,12 31,62 24,74 0,58 O. 11 1,32 
10,64 24,78 22.51 0,73 O. 11 1,50 
13,02 24,16 26.37 0,79 O. 12 1,47 
12,48 23,25 25.61 0,90 0, 13 1,50 
11 .97 33,54 19,03 0,85 O. 12 1,30 
9,78 26,90 17,00 0,68 0,10 0,95 
9,93 27,75 11,77 0,58 0,10 0.71 
13,48 36,67 13,83 0,56 0, 11 0,98 
14,17 38,53 23.31 0,68 0,13 1,29 
12,79 47,79 28.80 0,73 0, 13 1,28 
---- -- - ---- ------ ---- ------- ------------------
** Average for January-October. 
Table Gropes 
US$/1 00 Kg. 
12,76 
21,15 
24,74 
18.67 
22,44 
24.08 
19,32 
22,63 
29,68 
21,49 
12,82 
16,06 
18,33 
14,98 
---
SOURCE: Universidad Cat61ica. Statistics collected by the Deportment of Ag. Economics from different sources. 
Apples 
US$/100 Kg. 
8.72 
17.01 
10,78 
20,16 
18.02 
23,54 
16, 16 
14.61 
15,10 
12,56 
10,31 
10, 11 
8,25 
10,36 
, 
, 
o 
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YEA R Wheat 
US$/100 Kg. 
CIF 
Average 
1960-1970 22,52 
1973 36,10 
1974 40,40 
1975 34,70 
1976 41,30 
1977 18,80 
1978 21,20 
1979 25,20 
1980 23,70 
1981 22,10 
1982 18,60 
1983 17,80 
1984 16,20 
-- '-----
TABLE 12 CHILE. 
INTERNATIONAL PRICES FOR SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN CHILE 
(in 1985 US dollars) 
Corn Sugar Soya Oil Slaughtered Dry Milk Wool 
US$/lOO Kg. US$/ton. US$1100 Kg. Cottle Powder US$/Kg. 
US$/Kg. US$/Kg. 
CIF CIF CIF CIF CIF CIF 
- - -
2,55 1, 13 -
-
160,76 
-
5,20 1,54 1,03 
-
763,09 
-
4,57 1,34 3,72 
-
267,97 
-
3,08 1,44 5,50 
- 80,86 - 2,56 1, 15 5,66 
15,20 88,62 97,10 2,51 1,23 3,37 
15,40 130,86 89,20 2,36 1,32 3,97 
15,70 119,53 84,70 3,84 1,33 4,11 
16,00 218,28 68,60 3,85 1,55 3,52 
15,40 250,69 55,00 3,77 1,60 2,92 
12,50 163,47 43,60 2,84 1,49 3,02 
13, 10 194,48 47,70 2,76 1,39 3,57 
14,10 128,80 66,80 1,71 1,07 4,22 
- -----------
* Calculated by the Deportment of Ag. Economics Universidad Cat6lico. 
Table Gropes 
US$1100 Kg. 
FOB 
61,37 
73,30 
66,40 
96,70 
85,50 
85,20 
96,60 
118,10 
103,00 
102,60 
103,80 
87,20 
92,70 
---- --
SOURCE: Universidad Cat61ica. Statistics Collected by the Deportment ofAg. Economics from different sources. 
!~ 
Apples 
US$/1 00 Kg. 
FOB 
40,85 
61,40 
37,20 
61,10 
42,60 
41,80 
54,90 
46,30 
53,80 
46,80 
47,40 
36,50 
36,90 
i 
~ 
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and other selected countries, but until now has acted as a sanitary 
barrier (non-tariff barrier) restricting imports from neighbouring 
countries and generating higher prices for cattle in the internal 
market. The possibility that Chile will become a meat exporter will 
depend on its capacity to adjust slaughterhouses, penetrate foreign 
markets and expand the cattle herd to a number large enough to satisfy 
domestic consumption. 
Prices for fruits and vegetables have not been affected by government 
intervention. The differentials existing between internal and export 
prices along with the off-season characteristic of production are the 
main reasons behind the expansion of the fruit subsector in recent 
years. A similar effort is being made in vegetable production, but 
structural problems within this subsector (lack of sufficient research 
and a predominance of small farmers) is resulting in a slower and 
lagged response in this area (Table 13). 
TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
International trade in the Chilean agricultural sector is reviewed 
here from two standpoints. First, the analysis is limited only to 
flows within the agricultural sector. In this context agricultural 
exports present an outstanding record in Chile. They increased their 
share in the sector1s GOP from 4.9 percent in 1974 to over 20 percent 
in 1982 (Table 14). During this period (except for 1973) imports 
fluctuated between 10 and 17 percent of the agricultural GOP. The 
combination of these two variables shifted to positive in 1979 erasing 
the negative trade balance observed in this sector for decades. 
A more general analysis is the one that includes the flow of 
agricultural products and foodstuffs, which can be of agricultural 
origin. From this standpoint it is possible to observe that exports 
of foods and beverages fluctuated around US$70 million in the 1975-85 
period, while the nominal value of exports of agricultural products 
grew at an annual rate of 21 percent (14 percent in real terms). On 
the other hand, imports of agricultural products and foodstuffs are 
characterised by a decline between 1973 and 1975, and a recovery from 
that year to 1980, when they exceeded the US$1 billion mark. The 
depression occurred in 1982-83, and the macro-economic and sectorial 
measures adopted afterwards resulted in a sharp fall in imports, which 
decreased to US$250 million by 1985. Last year is the only one in 
this long time stretch with a positive trade balance for the aggregate 
of foods and agricultural products. 
FINAL REMARKS 
The liberalisation of the Chilean economy has represented a 
significant change in the way that both private and public sectors 
approach production and investment decisions. Today it is possible to 
observe many sectors and private enterprises performing at 
international standards and competing in world markets. Exports have 
increased their contribution to national product and they have 
surpassed the level of imports. Thus a trade surplus has developed in 
recent years improving the country1s capacity to grow and pay its 
international commitments. 
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TABLE 13 CHILE 
RATIOS OF DOMESTIC TO ~ANT INTERNATIONAL PRICES FOR SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
YEA R Wheat Corn Sugar beet 
'" 
Average 
1960-1970 0,38 - -
1973 0,10 - 0,49 
1974 0,36 - 0, 15 
1975 0,47 - 0,75 
1976 0,43 - 2,37 
1977 0,82 0,70 1,69 
1978 0,69 0,85 1, 12 
1979 0,58 0,79 1 , 18 
1980 0,56 0,75 0,93 
1981 0,56 0,64 0,65 
1982 0,64 0,79 1,03 
1983 0,91 1,03 1,14 
1984 1,05 1,00 1 ,81 
• (sugarbeet price/.165): Sugar Price • 
•• (rapeseed price /.40) : Soya Oil Price. 
**'" Fresh milk price: (Dry Mil Powder /9). 
SOURCE: Calculated from Tables 11 and 12. 
Rapeseed 
"'''' 
-
-
-
-
-
0,58 
0,74 
0,76 
0,69 
0,77 
0,67 
0,72 
0,87 
Beef Cottle Milk Wool Table Gropes 
* •• 
0,18 0,64 
-
0,21 
0.12 0,58 0,98 0,29 
0,21 0,72 0,28 0,37 
0, 11 0,63 0,13 0, 19 
0,23 0.86 0,23 0, 16 
0,29 0,80 0,44 0,28 
0,33 0,82 0,44 0,20 
0,23 0,88 0,37 0, 19 
0,22 0,70 0,37 0,29 
0, 18 0,56 0,33 0,21 
0,20 0,60 0,23 0, 12 
0,20 0,71 0,27 0, 18 
0,25 0,84 0,31 0,20 
---------- ------
i' 
Apples 
0,21 
0,28 
0,29 
0,33 
0,42 
0,56 
0,29 
0,32 
0,28 
0,27 
0,22 
0,21 
0,23 
(Y') 
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TABLE 14 CHILE. 
TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TRADE 
(in percentages of GDP) 
T 
YEA R ECONOMY AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Export Imports Trade Export Imports Trade 
Balance Balance 
1974 14,3 25,6 - 11,3 4,9 24,3 - 19,4 
1975 16,9 18,0 - 1,1 6,9 13,0 - 6,1 
1976 20,2 18,2 2,0 9,7 10,1 - 0,4 
1977 20,6 22,4 - 1 ,8 11,4 12,4 - 1,0 
1978 21,2 24,4 - 3,2 15,3 17,7 - 2,4 
1979 22,3 27,6 - 5,3 17,9 14,3 3,6 
1980 23,7 30,3 - 6,6 17,4 16,4 1,0 
1981 20,4 33,3 - 12,9 17,3 17,2 0,1 
1982 24,9 24,7 0,2 20,9 14,5 6,4 
1983 25,2 21, 1 4,1 n.o. n.a. _. 
1984 25,3 23,1 2,2 n.o. n.o. -
1985 26,4 20,1 6,3 n.o. n.o. -
n.a.= Not available 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Chile. Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 1960-1983. 
Banco Central de Chile. Boletln Mensual Abril 1986. 
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TABLE 15 CHILE. 
COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF FOODS AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
{in millions US dollars} 
, 
EXPORT IMPORT 
YEA R Agricultural Foods & Total CONSUMER GOODS INTERMEDIATE GOODS 
Products 8everoges* 
Agricultural Foods of Agricultural Foods of 
Origin Ind.Origin Origin Ind.Origin 
1973 22,0 4,8 26,8 9,0 167,5 304.0 137,6 
1974 47,3 11 ,3 58,6 10,0 35,8 328.7 213,3 
1975 76,4 62,6 139,0 11,5 13,9 240.5 69,8 
1976 111,0 33,2 144,2 8,9 39,2 246,6 74,2 
1977 149,8 57,6 207,4 13, 1 89,4 154,8' 121,5 
1978 185,5 52,8 238,3 18,7 113,5 282.6 83,0 
1979 221,3 93,2 314,5 32,7 137,0 277,0 133,3 
1980 281,2 114,7 395,9 40,2 382,7 357,5 243,5 
1981 297, 1 90,6 387,7 32,9 280,2 327,2 123,7 
1982 311 ,6 65,6 377 ,2 22,3 168,3 277,0 99,2 
1983 280,1 55,9 336,0 11,8 119,7 265,3 117,6 
1984 374,6 69,3 443,9 11,9 101,5 218,0 132,0 
1985 462,9 73,9 536,8 9,2 27,5 112,5 100,7 
--- - -- ---- -----
* exclude fishes and seafood. 
SOURCE: Banco Central de Chile. Boletin Mensual (Severol issues). 
t> 
TOT A L 
618, 1 
587,8 
335,7 
368,9 
378,8 
497,8 
580,0 
1.023,9 
764,0 
566,8 
514,4 
463,4 
249,9 
Agricultural 
and Foods 
Trade Balance 
- 591,3 
- 529,2 
- 196,7 
- 224,7 
- 171,4 
- 259,5 
- 265,5 
- 682,0 
- 376,3 
- 189,6 
- 178,4 
- 19,5 
286,9 
I 
I 
, 
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This dynamic response has mainly come frOln natural resource based 
activities like mining, forestry, fishing d1d agriculture. 
In or'der to achieve these positive results, a widespread reallocation 
of resources has occurred moving toward those productive activities 
with higher returns. In this adjust:nent process certain industries 
have suffered due to excessive previous protection, the type and 
quality of invested capital or because of productive inefficiencies. 
For the agricultural sector the confrontation vias somevJhat :nore 
difficult. On one side was the challenge iinpos(~d by macro decisions 
associated with the liberalisation of the economy, and on the other 
was the need to cope with international prices determined, in many 
cases, in non-perfect markets dominated by export subsidies and trade 
agreements. iJnder these conditions, Chilean farm producers were not 
always able to compete in a completely open market situation, and the 
authorities decided to establish price bands and d corresponding 
system of tari ffs for a group of 5e 1 ected cOfnlnod it i es in order to 
secure internal production. This practical approach has proven to be 
quite effective for Chile, and agricultural output has (~xpanded again 
based both on improved yields and the allocation of resources toward 
products with comparative advantages. 
Nevertlleless, in the Chilean case, it has been deillonstrated that 
specific agricultural policies are not sufficiently strong in the face 
of macro-economic decisions, especially those associated with the 
value of the exchange rate. 
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ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND IT'S IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE: 
THE CASE OF NEW ZEALAND 
Ralph Lattimore 
"There remains one obstacle to sterling joining 
the ms (European Monetary System): Mrs Thatcher 
still thinks there is something rather 
undignified about the pound's exchange rates 
being fixed one Sunday afternoon by a lot of 
haggling finance Ministers. The markets are 
trying to tell her that they feel comfier with 
such untidy compromises than with the 
1 eIl1ni ng-l ike behaviour of 25 year old foreign 
exchange dealers" 
Editorial, Economist, 12 April 1986 
SUr~t~ARY 
In July 1984, Government embarked on an ambitious programme 
of economic policy adjustment. This 'liberalisation ' regime 
attacked the import substitution bias, regulations, inflation and 
the fiscal deficit simultaneously but not in a balanced fashion. 
The effects of these policy changes will take some years to work out 
given lagged responses in many sectors, including agriculture. 
Nevertheless, the short term effects have been significant. 
It is argued that 
policy changes means that 
sector may be a poor guide 
policy package appears to 
agriculture and some other 
econoll1i c performance of the 
the particular timing and sequencing of 
current performance in the agricultural 
to future prospects. In part; cul ar the 
have induced a temporary recession in 
sectors wi til concomi ttant effects on the 
country as a whole. 
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I NTRODUCTI Ot~ 
The last two years has been the most radical period of 
economic policy change in New Zealand's history with the possible 
exception of the period from 1934 to 1938. 
The policy cflanges have altered the cOllllllercial operating 
environment in the private sector to such an extent that major 
change in industry performance is occurri ng (and wi 11 conti nue to 
occur). Asset and financial markets vlere, predictably the first to 
adj ust. Output, i nves tment and employment changes take much longer 
to work through, especially in the agricultural sector due to 
technical and biological lags. These latter changes take even 
longer to find out about, due to long statistics collection and 
processing lags. 
For these reasons thi s paper is 1 argely devoted to the 
short-term impact of the recent 'economic liberalisation' programme 
on the agri cul tural sector. These effects are important but are not 
as important potentially as the rnedium and longer term effects. 
It will be argued that the current performance of the 
agricultural sector is unlikely to reflect its future perfonnance 
because of the particular policy adjustment patll that Government has 
chosen. This will take us into tile speculative realm but hopefully 
it will provide some stimulus to the sort of discussion vie 
agricultural economists love so dearly, viz. discussion where views 
can be dogmatically stated without feat of contradiction by 'the 
facts' . 
The quotation at the beginning of the paper has virtually 
nothing to do with the content. It is there to remind us that the 
new economic policy regime that is developing will be politically 
detennined and that is a much wider information set tllan economics 
can cope with, the 'economic imperalists' notwithstanding, 
(Hirshleifer, 1985). Editorial writers of the Economist are 
somewhat renowned for their ideological purity but they have limits. 
The paper begins with a brief overview of how the 
agricultural sector has developed over the last 30 years within the 
context of New Zealand's import substitution strategy. This may be 
helpful in understanding the industry structure and policy balance 
as it existed in mid-1984. The second section of the paper is 
devoted to analysing the impact of policy reforms initiated in 1984 
after the election. Much of that analysis has been developed by 
other economists and I am merely trying to draw some of the threads 
together here. 
The final section concerns what might happen to agriculture 
in tile medium term future. What forecasts we present are 
qualitative in nature. Hopefully it will provide an opportunity 
for, those who have become 'affectionately' known as the 'Stalinists 
of the Treasury'* to thrash it out with the 'revisionists' of the 
1 Tlli s term 
prominent 
remaining 
intended. 
wa s used ( sa ti ri ca lly) by ~lr Ha rry Broad, a 
business and agricultural columnist. The 
labels are added as an embellishment with no harm 
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Oeparbnent of Trade and Industry, the 'Trotskyites' ~f the Ministry 
of Agriculture ilnd Fisheries, the 'reactionaries' of the Ul1iversity 
of Victoria, the 'dogll1atic libertarians' froln the University of 
Can terbury and the enl i ghtened academi cs from Li neal n Call ege. 
Joking aside, the New Zealand experiment in liberalisation is 
a 1 ready an important one in politi cal economy. From a soci a1 , 
political and an economic viewpoint, future policy changes may turn 
out to be more important than ones taken to date. The 
liberalisation progralmne may (hopefully) move Ne\v Zealand away from 
its traditional import substitution strategy, it may set in place 
only what has been achieved to date, it may back track on some 
policy changes or (more likely in my view) it may do a bit of each. 
THIRTY YEARS OF POLICY INTERVENTION 
Much has been written and continues to be written about the 
recent economi c hi story of NeVI Zeal and. Comprehensi ve treatments of 
the issues raised here, drawing together much other work, over the 
period frOIn 1938 to 1984 can be found in Hawke (1985), Gould (1982), 
Endres (1986), Lloyd et al (1980), Rayner and Lattimore (1986) and 
Lattimore (1986). 
The New Zealand agricultural sector is relatively large for 
a high income country comprising around 18 per cent of GOP and 
employing 20 per cent of the workforce, Tables 1 and 2. Half of 
these amounts are contributed by fanning itself. A high proportion 
of output frolll the sector is exported so that agriculture is a major 
component of the export sector in terms of both primary and 
manufactured exports, Table 3. 
Table 1: Agricultural Sector Output 
1976-77 % of GOP 1981-82 % of GOP $m $m 
Farming 1,364 10 2,305 8 Processing 782 6 1,590 5 Input Supply 302 2 652 2 Wholesale/Retail 155 1 319 1 Transport 107 1 189 1 
TOTAL 2,710 5,055 
Total Net Output 13,926 20.0 29,150 17.8 
Source: Stewart et al (1985) 
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Table 2: Agricultural Sector Employment 
1976-77 % of Total 1981-82 
No. in Hork Force No. 
Farming 106,641 8 113,565 
Processing 73,403 6 76,062 
Input Supply 29,752 2 35,755 
Whol esal ejRetdil 10,949 1 10,878 
Transport 10,340 1 9,886 
------- -------
TUTAL 231,085 18h 246,146 
Total Persons in 
NZ Workforce 1,272,333 1,332,342 
Source: Stelvart et al (1985) 
A second distinguishing feature 
recently has been the high and increasing 
intervention in the private sector. 
of the 
levels 
% of Total 
in Industry 
9 
6 
3 
1 
1 
20% 
economy unti 1 
of Government 
This is a relative concept again and only partly 
quantifyable. Nevertheless trade policy intervention, regulations, 
public ownership, loan guarantees to tIle private sector, moral 
suasion, taxes and subsidies have tended to be used extensively to 
guide or replace private sector activity. 
Two important themes are discernible in this intervention 
over the period 1934-84. The first is a strong bias in trade policy 
towards import substitution and the second is tight financial and 
foreign exchange controls. 
Import substitution policy went through various phases after 
the peri od 1934-38. The 1 ast epi sode began around 1964. At that 
time the average level of import protection in the form of tariffs 
(30 per cent) and quantitative restrictions, was of the order of 55 
per cent (domestic use weights), (Lattimore, 1986). It continued at 
that level until 1981 when the introduction of an import license 
tender system and expanding quotas resulted in a gradual reduction in 
import protection. Ctlart 1 gives a ordinal index of the degree of 
trade liberalisation over time (with higher indices indicating 
greater liberalisation). The high import protection regime from 1958 
is indicated by the import policy line. 
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Table 3: Composition of NZ Visible Exports 
1977 1978 1982 1983 1985 
Exports Based on: crude mfgd 1 Total crude mfgd Total crude mfgd Total crude mfgd Total crude mfgd Total 
a) Livestock 2123 53 2176 2080 96 2176 4112 194 4306 4748 266 5014 5781 864 6645 
b) Crops 144 43 187 144 97 241 519 82 601 626 134 760 1120 223 1343 
c) Forestry 150 71 221 145 116 260 363 232 595 289 248 537 337 391 728 
d) t~eta 1 5 140 3 143 165 11 176 291 2 293 366 116 483 849 22 871 
e) j·1a i nly imported 
or other 
materials 457 457 282 282 799 799 896 896 1201 12u~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
TOTAL £XPORTS 2557 627 3184 2534 602 3135 5285 1309 6594 6029 1660 7690 8087 2702 10789 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary 
1. % Total Exports 80 20 100 81 19 100 80 20 100 78 22 100 75 25 100 
2. % Based on local 
materials (a) to 
( d) 86 91 88 88 89 
3. % I'~anufacturers 
based on local 
materials % 27 53 39 46 55 
imported 
materi al s % 73 47 61 54 45 
Source: Derived frOln External Trade Statistics, NZ Dept of Statistics, Wellington 
1 r~anufactured or highly processed products 
Chart 1 
Index Index of Liberalisation 
15 
Episode Episode Episode 
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Begi nni ng in 1964 Government began to comper",sa te the export 
sector for import protection by providing grants, subsidies, export 
incentives and other tax concessions. The balance of import 
protection less export subsidies is denoted by the net import 
protection irldex in Chart 1. The corresponding rates of nominal 
import protection and export subsidisation are given in Tables 4 and 
5. By 1984, the trade policy balance continued to favour the import 
competiny sector but to a much lesser degree than in earlier years. 
The 'tariff compensation' package that Government had developed for 
the export sector was adding to the fiscal burden and compounding 
neutra 1 ity problems in the tax system. Both import protect; on and 
the export subsidies were unevenly applied across industries causing 
further distortion. 
Table 4: 
Year 
1938-64 
1964-67 
1972-73 
1978-79 
1983-84 
Export Incentives and Production Subsidiesl 
Nominal Rate of Export Subsidy Equivalent 
% 
0.1 
0.5 
1.7 
2.3 
11.1 
1 Industry assi stance to tile exportable sector i ncl udes grants and 
subsidies to primary producers, tax expenditures to the 
agricultural sector and export incentives to manufacturers. 
Source: Rayner and Lattimore (1986) 
Table 5: Nominal Rate of Import Protection 
A d Valor em Tar i ff E qui val en t 
Year Import Protection Rate 
1938-49 
1955-57 
1958-81 
1985 
very hiyh (60%) 
34 
56 
40 
Source: Rayner and Lattimore (1986) 
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t1lonetary and fiscal policy compounded resource allocation 
problems caused by trade policy. In the face of a volatile terms of 
trade, Table 6, New Zealand Government in the 1970's increasingly 
overvalued the dollar and financed current account deficits with 
foreign borrowing. For much of the period 1974-84, real interest 
rates were kept negative, Table 7, by interest rate and foreign 
exchange controls in the face of high inflation rates. 
The grm'lth, employment and inflation record of New Zealand 
over the import substitution period is not unfavourable by average 
world standards but poor by high income country standards, Table 7. 
There is growing evidence that import substitution caused a 
Significant misallocation of resources in the import competing sector 
Table 6: 
Year 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source: 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation, Terms of Trade and 
Forei gn DeDt 
[ilarket Exchange External Degree Official 
Rate Index Terms Trade Over-valuation Foreign Debt 
rU$/unit F.E. 1957=100 per cent per cent GOP 
1.200 85 +11 9.4 
1. 207 100 0 12.3 
1.213 96 +4 11.1 
1. 212 90 +11 9.5 
1. 215 94 +6 10.1 
1. 221 99 0 10.6 
1. 220 III -11 9.9 
1.220 108 -7 9.3 
1.227 107 -8 8.7 
1.23U 101 -1 9.8 
1.071 89 0 12.1 
1.069 88 0 11. 7 
1.070 87 +1 10.2 
1.069 83 +10 10.0 
1.044 93 -1 9.5 
1.143 113 -11 7.1 
1. 259 112 -5 5.1 
1.181 78 +23 10.8 
1.004 72 +19 17.3 
0.996 79 +9 18.6 
0.996 78 +19 . 21.4 
0.996 86 +11 21.0 
0.910 82 +10 20.6 
0.853 76 +18 20.1 
0.799 77 +lB 22.8 
0.742 74 +23 28.4 
0.742 74 +22 26.7 
0.593 73 +4 35.1 
Lattimore (1986) 
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Table 7: General Economic Indicators, 1951-85 
r~arch 
Year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196U 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1 The 
2 The 
Source: 
Annual Growth Rate Annual Registered Average Real Wage 1 Real In teres t( 
in Real G.N.P. Infl ati on (J, ) Unemployment Index 1977 Q4 = 1000 Rate % 
% Labour Force 
+13.9 11.1 0.0 792 -7.0 
-3.8 7.8 776 0.1% p.a. -3.7 
+0.6 4.3 6.1 790 0.0 
+6.0 4.5 811 0.0 
+7.7 2.7 823 2.0 
+2.2 3.4 810 1.4 
+2.6 2.2 2.4 829 O.l%p.a. 2.9 
+1.6 4.3 801 0.9 
+0.1 3.8 785 1.4 
+6.5 0.7 0.1 820 4.3 
+5.7 2.0 817 3.0 
+1.2 2.6 2.7 822 0.1 % p.a. 2.7 
+5.3 1.9 822 3.6 
+5.8 3.4 819 3.8 
+6.6 3.6 840 2.2 
+5.5 3.6 841 2.5 
-2.2 6.2 4.9 834 0.1 % p.a. 0.1 
-0.3 4.3 830 2.3 
+0.6 4.8 836 1.9 
+3.6 6.6 0.1 887 0.2 
+3.9 10.7 0.3 985 -3.8 
+9.4 6.6 10.5 0.2 1006 5.4 % p.a. 0.8 
+11.6 8.9 0.1 1040 -1.3 
+4.4 11.4 0.3 1063 -3.5 
-4.1 14.8 0.3 1040 -6.6 
-2.2 17.2 0.4 1008 -8.6 
+5.1 14.5 0.6 1002 -0.1 % p.a. -4.9 
-1.8 11.1 14.8 1.8 1016 -0.8 
-1.6 15.2 2.0 1034 -4.3 
+3.7 16.3 2.8 1044 -4.9 
+0.6 15.4 3.7 1080 -2.5 
+2.8 16.6 12.0 3.9 1041 -1.9 % p.a. -2.3 
+4.1 5.4 5.6 972 9.8 
+0.3 7.0 4.9 937 7.2 
16.3 886 -3.1 
average wage deflated by the C. P. 1. 
average interest rate on registered new mortgages less the rate of increase in the C. P. r. 
Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Deparbnent of Statistics, Wellington 
and exportable sector. The export base remained narrow and the 
volatility of the terms of trade may have, in part, been caused by 
import substitution. The relative importance of trade in the economy 
fell, particularly in the 1950 l s and 1960 1 s, reflecting the 
constraint on exports. 
The real effective exchange rates for agricultural products 
varied considerably over the last 30 years in response to changing 
world export prices, the degree of export subsidisation and the 
degree of exchange rate overvaluation in relation to domestic costs, 
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Table 8. The output response to these factors and biological and 
technical considerations is shown in Table 9. 8eef output and 
exports rose sharply in the late 1960's mainly in response to higher 
world prices, Chart 2. The output of sheepmeat and wool were 
stimulated by high real export prices for sheepmeats over the period 
1976-82 and increasing export subsidies. 
Table 8: Real Effective Exchange Rates l - Relative to 
Non-Tradeables Indices 1970 = 100 
Exports Import 
Year Sheep- Other Competing 
meat Wool Beef Dairy Mdnufacturing Manufacturing 
1958 84 
1959 69 
1960 73 
1961 67 
1962 61 
1963 69 
1964 72 
1965 9U 
1966 80 
1967 75 
1968 85 
1969 92 
1970 100 
1971 100 
1972 88 
1973 123 
1974 144 
1975 124 
1976 III 
1977 106 
1978 98 
1979 100 
1980 100 
1981 III 
1982 128 
1983 129 
1984 121 
150 67 
140 71 
163 65 
148 66 
143 62 
148 64 
188 66 
152 65 
145 73 
126 77 
89 81 
103 95 
100 100 
94 108 
102 110 
201 125 
225 132 
152 83 
160 79 
179 65 
150 68 
143 84 
149 88 
138 81 
136 75 
113 79 
124 85 
103 
129 
144 
106 
107 
121 
130 
135 
122 
110 
102 
103 
100 
105 
167 
129 
109 
114 
117 
102 
105 
97 
87 
94 
118 
118 
115 
65 
67 
68 
68 
76 
78 
80 
79 
95 
96 
100 
104 
104 
105 
116 
133 
126 
103 
101 
100 
98 
92 
93 
104 
120 
75 
75 
76 
77 
78 
80 
82 
81 
93 
96 
100 
104 
104 
102 
106 
131 
125 
102 
99 
95 
93 
88 
86 
92 
101 
1 The New Zealand dollar price of goods inflated by the 
nrnninal rate of assistance and deflated by the price of 
non-tradeables. The export and import price of other 
manufactured goods is taken as the average GDP deflator for 
GECD countries US$ (which is intermediate between the US 
wholesale price index and GECD export price index for 
manufactured export goods (SITC 5-8). 
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Table 9: Gross Real Farm Output, by Product 
Year Wool Sheepmeat Beef 
(ending June) 
1950 101 94 51 
1 102 97 54 
2 108 3.0% p.a. 96 2.9% p.a. 57 3.4% p.a. 
3 111 95 65 
4 113 105 58 
5 122 106 71 
6 124 111 69 
7 134 6.0 110 5.9 69 7.9 
8 136 124 81 
9 147 136 81 
1960 153 138 81 
1 159 146 79 
2 160 3.0 153 3.5 90 2.0 
3 171 155 95 
4 169 160 89 
5 171 162 94 
6 193 167 96 
7 193 3.4 180 3.4 108 8.1 
8 196 187 125 
9 198 187 125 
1970 195 193 140 
1 198 185 145 
2 191 -2.6 201 -2.1 132 1.1 
3 184 183 128 
4 172 167 132 
5 181 167 120 
6 193 182 128 
7 192 2.1 187 2.3 128 -2.1 
8 184 190 122 
9 190 186 118 
1980 214 220 120 
1 230 223 117 
2 219 3.4 219 7.3 122 -0.4 
3 216 240 116 
Source: Wallace and Philpott (1984 ) 
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THE 'LI~ERALISATION' PROGRAMME 
The new Government came to power in July 1984 with the fixed 
exchange rate seriously overvalued, depleting foreign exchange 
reserves and a large budget deficit. A prograll1ne of wage, price and 
interest rate controls was in place. 
Structurally, the economy was still poorly conditioned 
though the degree of gross import protection had been reduced from 
55 per cent in 1981 to around 45 per cent in 1984, (Rayner and 
Lattimore, 1986). The level of export subsidisation was at its 
peak, averaging 11 per cent in 1984, Table 4. As a result the 
degree of import subsidisation bias was lower than it had been since 
the mid-1950's. However, there was a great deal of variation in 
relative incentives at the industry level on both the" importable and 
exportable side. 
Government devalued by 20 per cent and over the next few 
months removed wage, price, interest rate and other financial 
controls. It announced the phasing out of production subsidies and 
grants over a two year period and tax incentives for export 
manufacturers over a 4 year period. The exchange rate was floated 
in j1larch 1985. 
With continued depression in export prices and a virtually 
unregulated financial sector, expectations were for an expansion in 
areas of non-intervention. Asset prices reacted immediately. Share 
market values rose steeply v/hile rural (and urban) property prices 
fell in nominal terms, Chart 3. The real exchange rate, RER, 
(defined in Chart 4 as the price of non-tradeables to tradeables to 
correspond to banking practise in New Zealand), fell for 3 quarters 
following devaluation but only by one third of the nominal 
devaluation. Following the float, the RER rose as a result of an 
appreciation of the market exchange rate, softening export prices 
and riSing domestic prices and costs. In the current quarter the 
real exchange is probably 5 per cent higher (appreciated) than prior 
to devaluation. Farm incomes fell accordingly in 1985/86 to half 
their average value for the period since 1981, in real terms, Table 
10. 
The deteriorating asset/income position of the farm sector 
is summarised in Chart 5 in nominal tenns. Other industries in tile 
tradeable sector have been placed in the saine income/cost squeeze 
reflected in the real exchange rate with the result that the current 
account deficit continued to rise from 7 per cent of GNP in 1984 to 
nearly 9 per cent in 1985 (Rayner and Lattimore, 1986). The funding 
of the deficit changed from predominantly Government foreign 
borrowing in 1984 to predominantly private funding last year. 
Import protection continues to be reduced as part of the 
liberalisation programme both for import licensing and the customs 
tariff. (In fact there was quite a milestone in New Zealand history 
on the first of January this year: a few tariffs relating to 
. non-competing ilnports were abolished, the first tariff reduction in 
our European history). 
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